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Émigré Anti-Imperialists and America’s Philippines, 1898-1899 
 
 By August of 1898, the United States had already won the 
Spanish-American War. President McKinley had successfully asked 
Congress for a declaration of war only the previous April, and U.S. 
victories in Cuba and the Philippines forced the Spanish to sign an 
armistice on August 12th ceding ownership of Cuba, Puerto Rico, one of 
the Caroline Islands (eventually determined to be Guam), and some level 
of control over the Philippines. The remaining Spanish forces were on the 
way out, the American forces shifted into occupation mode, and 
celebrations welcomed soldiers returning home in cities across the United 
States.1 
 But those on the ground knew that the occupation of the former 
Spanish territories, especially the Philippines, would inspire resistance. It 
remained unclear whether the Americans would absorb the Philippines 
whole, just keep Manila or a coaling station like Subic Bay on the western 
side of Luzon, or leave the islands all together. The cabinet said that the 
American troops, already occupying Manila, should hold their positions, 
and otherwise wait for the negotiators to work it out. This uncertainty 
about American goals ramped up the tensions between the U.S. military 
and the Army of Liberation of the Philippine Republic, led by Emilio 
                                                 
1 David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-
1902 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 32-61. 
 2 
Aguinaldo, who was also President of the Philippine Republic which had 
been declared in January. The Filipinos had already revolted against the 
Spanish and fought them before the Americans had arrived. But now, 
viewed suspiciously by the Americans and prevented from entering 
Manila, they had dug in and formed lines around the city. Both forces 
waited to see how the negotiations panned out. Meanwhile, the question of 
what to do with the Philippines became the main unsettled issue in 
negotiations with the Spanish and debate among Americans. Powerful 
figures like McKinley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore 
Roosevelt, Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and naval strategist 
Alfred Thayer Mahan all argued for annexing the islands outright, and a 
majority of the media and the population supported them.2 
 Opponents of annexation, and the prior war with Spain, had to 
organize to be heard. Held in Boston in June 1898, the first mass meeting 
of anti-imperialists led to the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League in 
November, assembled to stand for independence for all of the former 
Spanish colonies taken in the war. The war with Spain had already come 
and gone, with opposition to it achieving little to slow it down. But the 
members of the new League, headed by Republican former Massachusetts 
                                                 
2 Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire, 61-64, also Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-
Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," The Journal of Southern History 
24, no. 3 (August 1958): 319-323. 
 
 3 
Senator George S. Boutwell, hoped to effect a real protest against the 
United States holding far-flung colonies of its own.3 
 The Anti-Imperialist League drew support from a vast array of 
Americans. With diverse branches in several major American cities, its 
members included writers, businessmen, philosophers, lawyers, social 
activists, peace activists, Henry George-style single taxers, and everything 
in between.4 It was not short on luminaries: Mark Twain, former President 
Grover Cleveland, Ambrose Bierce, William James, Jane Addams and 
William Graham Sumner were just some of its members. But it was short 
on cohesiveness. Other than generally opposing Philippine annexation, its 
members’ reasons and beliefs differed on subjects from economics to 
racism to political preferences to pacifism. Everything from anti-
imperialism to women’s suffrage to the Georgist single tax was promoted 
by one member or another of the League, often at League meetings and 
events, and the clarity of its message suffered as a result.5 
 Despite the League’s diversity, clear groups can be found within it. 
One such group consists of Edwin Lawrence Godkin, Carl Schurz, 
Andrew Carnegie, and Samuel Gompers. All four of them were key 
members of the League and of the larger anti-imperialist movement, and 
                                                 
3 Jim Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American 
Solidarity,” Amerasia Journal 24, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 65-68, 72-74. 
4 Erin L. Murphy, "Women's Anti-Imperialism, 'The White Man's Burden,' and the 
Philippine-American War: Theorizing Masculinist Ambivalence in Protest," Gender & 
Society 23, no. 2 (April 2009): 251. 
5 Zwick, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Solidarity,” 
72-81, also Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," 
325-331, also Murphy, "Women's Anti-Imperialism, 'The White Man's Burden,' and the 
Philippine-American War: Theorizing Masculinist Ambivalence in Protest," 251-257. 
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all four were born in Europe, emigrated to America relatively early in their 
lives, and became prominent men in American society by the late 19th 
century. These émigré anti-imperialists form a long-ignored bloc within 
American anti-imperialism, generally consistent in their backgrounds and 
in an anti-imperialism rooted in their valuing individual liberty over all 
else. 
 
* * * * * 
  
Edwin Lawrence Godkin loved a good argument, but he might 
have preferred it if the fight over Philippine annexation came when he was 
a bit younger. According to his biographer, William M. Armstrong, “[B]y 
1895 Godkin had lost much of his energy and zest for combat,” writing 
fewer editorials, taking longer European vacations, and leaving much of 
the work of filling The Nation’s pages to his young protégé Rollo Ogden.6 
By 1897, Godkin was writing less than a fifth of the Evening Post’s 
editorials, and, according to Horace White, taking credit for the editorial 
writing of Joseph B. Bishop and leaving his duties to Horace White and 
Wendell Garrison, yet still drawing a full salary.7  
Godkin, once seemingly a man of boundless energy, had slowed. 
He felt defeated by the times, and by the kind of men in charge of both the 
United States and England. In an October 10th, 1897 letter to Louise 
                                                 
6 Edwin Lawrence Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. L. Godkin, ed. William M. 
Armstrong (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1974), 472. 
7 Godkin, Gilded Age Letters, ed. Armstrong, 486-487. 
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Dawson, he wrote, “I am far less excited and interested than I used to be. I 
am more and more inclined to the opinion of the old Englishman who said 
to me ‘he was in favor of letting every nation go to the devil in its own 
way.’”8 He further confided his disappointment in a letter to her on 
November 10th, after reformer and college president Seth Low was 
defeated in a bid for Mayor of New York City: “I am tired of having to be 
continually hopeful; what I long for now is a little comfortable private 
gloom in despair. It seems in America as if man was made for 
government, not government for man.”9 
 Godkin had always viewed the Nation, and later the Post, as an 
extension of himself. Born in Moyne (near Dublin) in 1831, the son of a 
Presbyterian minister and journalist, young Godkin struggled with illness 
as a child, did well but not tremendously well at Queen’s College, Belfast, 
and after graduation briefly studied the law before working as a war 
correspondent and taking an American law degree.10 Once sufficiently 
established, he founded the Nation in 1865, with a prospectus promising it 
would be a “really critical spirit” that would offer something better than 
the ordinarily strident political writing of the time.11 Godkin promised this 
kind of writing because he planned to do the bulk of it himself. The extent 
of it is uncertain, but contemporaries and scholars generally agree that 
Godkin wrote much of its content (at the time there were no bylines on its 
                                                 
8 Godkin, Gilded Age Letters, ed. Armstrong, 496. 
9 Godkin, Gilded Age Letters, ed. Armstrong, 498.  
10 William M. Armstrong, E.L. Godkin and American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 1957), 16. 
11 Armstrong, E. L. Godkin and American Foreign Policy 1865-1900, 18. 
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articles), and Godkin made sure the rest of the articles matched what he 
would write, through his editing and by choosing writers and assistants 
who supported his favorite causes: radical Republicans and abolitionists, 
proponents of “hard money” and the English classical economy, and an 
unwavering commitment to erudition in journalistic writing.12 Godkin 
tried to get intelligent reporters “of strong moral sense” to make the 
highest quality journal he could, saying that “as long as the press is what it 
is, a kind of moral and intellectual dunghill.”13 As it grew, the journal 
would also match Godkin’s ongoing intellectual growth, in everything 
from economics to social science.14 Godkin sold the Nation to the New 
York Evening Post in 1881 in exchange for an associate editorship, co-
running the journal with Horace White and with Carl Schurz, who had left 
Washington and the Cabinet behind after Garfield’s election in 1880. But 
Godkin found collaboration with the two men too much to bear, and 
bought them both out in 1883, making him sole editor-in-chief, and 
allowing him to make the Evening Post essentially a daily edition of the 
weekly Nation.15  
Godkin was passionate about both journals because they were 
entirely his, and even as he retired, he sought to have the title and 
                                                 
12 Armstrong, E. L. Godkin and American Foreign Policy 1865-1900, 15-23. 
13 Letter to Charles Eliot Norton, written fall of 1866. Cited in Edward Caudill, “E. L. 
Godkin and His (Special and Influential) View of 19th Century Journalism,” Journalism 
Quarterly 69 (Winter 1992): 1041. 
14 Edward Caudill, “E. L. Godkin and the Science of Society,” Journalism Quarterly 66 
(Spring 1989): 57-64. 
15 Armstrong, E. L. Godkin and American Foreign Policy 1865-1900, 25-30, also Caudill, 
“E. L. Godkin and His (Special and Influential) View of 19th Century Journalism”, 1039-
1040, also Trefousse, Carl Schurz, 253-258. 
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recognition he deserved for it. When Henry Villard rebuked him for 
drawing a full salary during a five-month vacation abroad, Godkin 
responded with a heated defense of his centrality in the paper’s existence: 
“It is not my writing in the Post on which I plume myself the most, and 
which made me say the stockholders are indebted to me, but my editorial 
management. Every feature in the Post which distinguishes it from its 
contemporaries is due to me. Its high character, its independence, its 
veracity, its influence in this community as a moral force, are due to 
me.”16 But he had to admit that he was spent. One advantage of his long 
European vacations was that, as he wrote to Louise Dawson, “I keep calm 
about American politics by not reading the papers.”17 And he tried to get 
enough fresh air to help his rheumatism whenever he could, further 
distancing him from daily journalistic operations. In October of 1899, the 
Board granted him three more months’ full salary, with the understanding 
that he would no longer be editor-in-chief at the start of the new year.18 
Godkin accepted. For him, giving up the control and the work at the paper 
was like giving up the most important part of himself. 
 Godkin was opposed to the Spanish-American War primarily 
because he felt it betrayed the grand American traditions that attracted him 
to the United States in the first place. In the summer of 1899, with the 
Philippine-American War already begun and annexation a confirmed fact, 
                                                 
16 Letter to Henry Villard, Feb. 13, 1897. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. L. 
Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 486. 
17 Letter to Louise Dawson, May 24th, 1897. Godkin had been in Italy for six weeks when 
he wrote it. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 487. 
18 Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 522. 
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he wrote  that “American ideals were the intellectual food of my youth, 
and to see America converted into a senseless, Old World conqueror, 
embitters my age.”19 Godkin saw Gilded Age America as a corruption of 
everything he loved about the older, more pastoral America. For him, the 
American past that attracted him to immigrate was a time of reason and 
morality, but by the turn of the century, America as he saw it was ruled by 
the “moral anarchy” of modern business, and by men who “rarely open a 
book” and “know no more, read no more, and have no more to say than 
the bricklayer and the plumber.”20 Godkin’s desire to combat what he saw 
as a fatal lack of erudition and moral character in America was reflected in 
the consciously maintained and upheld high style and quality of his paper. 
Godkin did not see the war with Spain as the United States’ 
running to the aid of the beleaguered Cubans or liberating the oppressed 
Filipinos, but as jingoist popular sentiment harnessed by the Republicans 
for a cynical, imperialistic land grab. As early as the Venezuelan border 
dispute in 1895, when there was a chance of a war with England, he wrote 
his British friend James Bryce that “I have seen this Jingo policy coming, 
among the Republicans for a year and a half and have been pounding 
away at it in the Evening Post…they are building a large navy, and I am 
very certain will have a war with [England] when they get it ready.”21 Of 
                                                 
19 Letter to E. B. Smith, summer of 1899. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. L. 
Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 521. 
20 Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New 
York City: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 60. 
21 Letter to James Bryce, Jan. 9th, 1896. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. L. 
Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 477-478. 
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course, Godkin was an Anglophile and against any war with his former 
home, but he was still correct to expect a warlike, naval action by the 
United States in the near future. When he realized that American 
aggression would go against Spain and not Britain, he still saw nothing but 
calculation in it. He wrote again to Bryce in March 1898: “We are busy 
preparing for war, and McKinley has got fifty millions to spend as he 
pleases. He will, if he can keep the Cuban matter dragging along till 
November, be renominated and reelected. … The scheme is working 
admirably thus far. We keep edging towards war fast enough to keep the 
jingoes quiet, and yet not fast enough to frighten or alarm the good people, 
and we owe it all to the good and great McKinley. Justum et tenacem 
propositi virum.”22 War was declared less than a month later. 
 Godkin also framed his argument against American imperialism in 
terms of the danger of imitating the British Empire. As an expatriate and 
frequent visitor of that Empire, he could not help comparing his old and 
new homes, but the comparison was made plainer by the outbreak of the 
Second Boer War in October 1899. He firmly believed that Joseph 
Chamberlain and others in the British government were unnecessarily 
seeking a war in South Africa and following McKinley’s model to get the 
United Kingdom’s people behind it.23 When that war broke out, it doubly 
saddened Godkin. He sent his sympathies to Bryce’s wife: “You now 
                                                 
22 Letter to James Bryce, March 22nd, 1898. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. 
L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 502-503. 
23 Letter to Charles Eliot Norton, July 1st, 1899. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of 
E. L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 520. 
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know what we have been through, seeing a perfectly avoidable war forced 
on by a band of unscrupulous politicians, the permission of whom to exist 
and flourish on the part of the Almighty always puzzles me; and behind 
them a roaring mob.”24 Godkin blamed a combination of political 
deception and popular gullibility as the means by which America was put 
on the jingoist path. Seeing his former country and his chosen country 
both seek wars of choice was just too much for Godkin’s liberal heart to 
bear. And he also did not expect that the American government, 
maintaining the pretense of seeking independence, would make the efforts 
necessary for governing its new quasi-colonies properly: “The one thing 
which will prevent expansion being a disgrace, is a permanent colonial 
civil service, but who is doing a thing or saying a word about it? … We 
‘took the responsibility’ of the Indians one hundred years ago, but what 
has happened?”25 
Godkin believed that, whether the empire was British or American, 
it would not be able elevate the natives of a foreign place by bloodily 
conquering it, and regardless, it was under no obligation to do so. A lead 
editorial in the Nation, still Godkin’s media voice in October of 1898, 
claimed ignorance as to why “the Filipinos have not the right to try to 
govern themselves as well as any other people. If they fail we consider it 
no concern of ours, any more than to accelerate their progress towards 
                                                 
24 Letter to Mrs. James Bryce, Nov. 14, 1899. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. 
L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 525. 
25 Letter to Emily Tuckerman, Feb. 4th, 1899. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. 
L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 561-517. 
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civilization and self-government."26 Godkin also did not support violence 
in general, and certainly did not find the fighting going on in the 
Philippines and the Caribbean to be palatable. He wrote to his son that “I 
do not care a ‘two penny damn’ for the happiness of the Spanish 
Americans, and do not feel in the least responsible for it. … The 
subjugation of the Spaniards was a sad business. They were slaughtered 
without resistance. ‘Gunning’ them was like shooting a monk.”27 If the 
White Man was so civilized, Godkin maintained, he would not act the way 
he was acting in the Philippines.  
Godkin had a vision of how America should act in the world, and it 
did not include the kind of fighting and subjugating happening in the 
Philippines. Godkin’s ideal America would be run by level-headed elites, 
respectful of individual liberty and agency, and not subject to the whims 
of the easily swayed and excitable people. He believed an ideal of equality 
generated, not a system with an “equality of burdens,” but instead a 
“disregard for special fitness” and for greatness, causing American society 
to rot from within.28 He believed that rooting the country in policies like 
sound money, a reformed civil service, and a strong press would aid this, 
all stabilizing the economy, the bureaucracy of government, and the 
political discourse. But other than avowing that the country could not 
                                                 
26 The Nation, LXVIII (October 27th, 1898). Cited in Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the 
Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," 330. 
27 Letter to Lawrence Godkin, Aug. 5th, 1898. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. 
L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 508. 
28 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900, 62. 
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become “a republic of kindly patricians charged with the board, lodging, 
washing, and amusement of a vast and discontented proletariat,” Godkin 
was truly cynical about the possibility of turning America into anything 
truly ideal, especially after the nation’s gleeful march into a standing 
policy of imperialism.29 As he wrote his friend Charles Eliot Norton in 
1895, Godkin expected that America would undergo “a long period of 
decline like that which followed the fall of the Roman Empire, and then a 
recrudescence under some other form of society.”30 Godkin knew that the 
country could not go back in time, and so his bleak hope was for some sort 
of rebirth. 
 Godkin was accused by some, with merit, of being an elitist. He 
had little interest in writing to reach the masses, unlike “newspaper 
barons” of the time like William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. 
Those publishers were aware of the difference and did not think much of 
what they saw as Godkin’s snobbiness. Pulitzer famously said that, by 
reforming the New York World and putting it in mass circulation, he 
would talk “to a nation, not a select committee.”31 It was a conscious 
contrast with Godkin, who sought to reach the brightest minds in the 
country and influence opinion from the top down. 
Godkin’s elitism meant that, though he chiefly blamed McKinley 
and his cohorts in power for the war and for the annexation of the 
                                                 
29 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 66. 
30 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 69. 
31 Caudill, “E. L. Godkin and His (Special and Influential) View of 19th Century 
Journalism,” 1039. 
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Philippines, he had no love for the average American’s support of 
jingoistic foreign invasions either. He saw the latest generation of 
Americans as particularly dim, and that, having “grown up under the 
newspapers, and the ‘Americanism’ of the schoolbooks…[they] look on 
instructed or thoughtful people, people who are influenced by human 
experience, as ‘bad Americans,’ or pessimists.” Godkin thought the rest of 
the press was a big part of the problem, that “the newspapers stand 
between this generation and the light and make it very hard to get at them, 
and the danger is that we shall have some frightful catastrophe before we 
settle down to the plain and rational living arranged for the republic by the 
Founders.”32 However, he was not totally cynical about the middle and 
lower classes. Though he predicted that the Treaty of Paris would be 
ratified, on the second try if not the first, Godkin expected that the public 
would soon see through McKinley and the Republicans and that they 
would be defeated in the 1900 elections.33 This did not come to pass, but it 
shows that Godkin did not hold the general American public entirely in 
contempt. 
Godkin, and the rest of the American press, had spent little time or 
ink on the Philippines before the Spanish-American War. According to 
Richard Hofstadter, American magazines only had thirty-five articles 
                                                 
32 Letter to William James, Dec. 29th, 1895. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. 
L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 476-477. 
33 Letter to Emily Tuckerman, Feb. 4th, 1899. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. 
L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 508. Also Letter to James Bryce, September 17th, 1898. Cited 
in Armstrong, E. L. Godkin and American Foreign Policy 1865-1900, 521. 
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about the islands in the entire period from 1818 to May 1898.34 Dewey’s 
victory changed that and pushed the Philippine issue to the fore in the 
general public’s mind. But those who favored imperialist policies often 
had work to do in trying to make the public back them. Theodore 
Roosevelt, in January of 1898, wrote, in disappointment about failed 
attempts to annex Hawaii, that he was “a good deal disheartened at the 
queer lack of imperial instinct that our people show.”35 
Godkin had seen the Jingoist movement gaining attention since the 
Venezuelan boundary crisis of 1895, and thought they were capable of a 
war like the Spanish-American one long before it happened. Though 
Godkin could not have predicted that the Philippines would be a theater of 
American imperialist action, he did rail against the jingoist movement in 
the pages of the Evening Post and the Nation, and he saw men like 
Theodore Roosevelt as the root of the movement, emphasizing militarism 
and aggression as a vigorous policy for a new America.36 Shortly after the 
Venezuelan dispute, Godkin wrote to his friend James Bryce in England, 
that “you cannot overrate the ignorance of the rest of the world of these 
Western men, and indeed of all the politicians, their conceit, and 
immorality. … The Professors and Clergy, and all the thinking educated 
class stood firm as far as I see. But there is not a statesman left in public 
                                                 
34 Richard Hofstadter, “Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,” in The Paranoid 
Style in American Politics and Other Essays, by Richard Hofstadter (New York City: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 169. 
35 W. A. Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian Republic (Selinsgrove, PA, 1961), 219. Cited in 
Hofstadter, “Cuba the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,” 170. 
36 Letter to James Bryce, Jan. 9th, 1896. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. L. 
Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 477-478. 
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life, and you may consider yourselves dealing with a semi-barbarous 
Power.”37 
Godkin’s pen was always outspoken, and often vitriolic. His 
editorials were, as historian Allan Nevins called them, a “weekly judgment 
day,” emphasizing criticism over the other facets of editorial writing.38 He 
drew the anger of many a target: Theodore Roosevelt said that Godkin 
suffered from “a species of moral myopia, complicated with intellectual 
strabismus,” and Boston banker Henry L. Higginson said Godkin’s words 
were “so twisted and stained by great conceit, arrogance, evil temper, that 
they lost their fairness, their perspicacity, their virtue and therefore their 
value.”39 Godkin’s critical nature and his ability to skillfully take down the 
object of his criticism were the foundations of his writing, but gave it a 
consistently negative tone.40 
In this negativity, and in his old age, Godkin fit with much of the 
anti-imperialist movement. The imperialists drew support with an 
argument relying on two large themes, encompassed in the words Duty 
and Destiny. The former was America’s solemn obligation to take on the 
burden of governing the Filipinos, and the latter invoked a sense that 
America’s swift military victories pointed to a divine plan that the United 
States would expand, and that those conquered would have to accept its 
                                                 
37 Letter to James Bryce, February 3rd, 1896. From Godkin, The Gilded Age Letters of E. 
L. Godkin, ed. Armstrong, 480. 
38 Allan Nevins, The Evening Post: A Century of Journalism (Boni and Liveright, New 
York, 1922), 543. Cited in Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-
1900, 55. 
39 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900, 56. 
40 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, 56. Also Caudill, “E. L. Godkin and His (Special and 
Influential) View of 19th Century Journalism,” 1044-1045. 
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inevitability. These arguments had a positivity to them which the anti-
imperialists could never quite overcome. Anti-imperialists often spoke of 
American traditions of the consent of the governed, and inconsistently 
argued against the racial components of imperialist philosophy. But their 
arguments were intellectual ones, without the thrill of conquest and 
expansion or the vision of Providence smiling down on Dewey’s fleet. 
And their political goals were limited ones: the practical Anti-Imperialist 
League hopes of preventing the two-thirds necessary to ratify the 1898 
Treaty of Paris were on an exponentially lesser order than imperialist 
dreams of a conquering America leading the world.41 The disparity in tone 
between the imperialist and anti-imperialist arguments meant that young 
Americans broadly supported imperialism, while luminaries toward the 
end of their careers and lives were the stern, disapproving face of anti-
imperialism. Fred H. Harrington reports that the average age of prominent 
Republican Anti-Imperialist League members was 71.1 years, and that its 
forty-one Vice Presidents were an average of 58.3 years old. Meanwhile, 
the “average age of fourteen leaders of expansionism of 1898 was 51.2,” 
and the American consul in London, William M. Osborne, wrote to 
McKinley that “there is a tremendous party growing up for expansion of 
territory, especially by the younger and more active elements in the 
                                                 
41 Hofstadter, “Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,” 172-176, also Zwick, “The 
Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity,” 
65-66, also Lasch, “The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man,” 
319-320. 
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country.”42 However much respect or agreement Godkin may have had, he 
certainly reinforced the image of the anti-imperialist as an older and more 
cynical American public figure. His paper had been intended, from the 
beginning, as a journal with “a specialty of being the paper to which 
sober-minded people would look … instead of hollering and bellering and 
shouting platitudes like the Herald and Times.”43 This philosophy only 
became more pronounced as he aged, and fit in with his fellow notable 
anti-imperialists. 
 A pronounced cynicism was part of Godkin’s worldview by the 
turn of the century and was only reinforced by American activities in the 
Philippines. Godkin had opposed American adventuring in Nicaragua, 
hopes to unseat Maximillian I of Mexico, and what he called Grant’s 
“policy of absorbing semi-civilized Catholic states” by attempting to 
annex Santo Domingo. Godkin railed against further American 
aggressiveness toward Nicaragua, Samoa, Chile, and other Latin 
American regions, begging that the country not take “a pugilist’s view” of 
foreign policy. Ever the Anglophile, he was “thunderstruck” by those who 
called for war with Great Britain over the Venezuelan border dispute in 
1895.44 So when the Spanish-American War broke out, and especially 
once McKinley’s government was considering keeping far-flung island 
                                                 
42 Fred H. Harrington, “The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-
1900,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (September 1935), 211-30. Cited in 
Hofstadter, “Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,” 173. 
43 Letter to Wendell P. Garrison in 1883, from Rollo Ogden, The Life and Letters of 
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possessions from a war that initially began to ostensibly help oppressed 
Cubans, Godkin was not among those who were surprised. Godkin 
believed that this sort of American policy was a long time in coming, and 
despite the best efforts of his well-regarded pen, the policy was being 
implemented. He had written, before the beginning of the Philippine 
insurrection further convinced him, that “I can not help thinking this 
triumph over Spain seals the fate of the American republic.”45 Too old to 
fight it, Godkin gave up. 
 It broke Godkin’s heart to see America lose its way, because, like 
the other émigré anti-imperialists, he had originally come to the United 
States and made it his new home because of its wonderful ideals. He 
considered the bloody violence and tortures of American forces in the 
Philippine insurrection to be a “shameless abandonment of the noble faith 
under which we have lived for a century,” substituting the American belief 
in the inviolable consent of the governed for brutal repression of faraway 
peoples. In his private letters of late 1898 and early 1899, Godkin wrote 
that “American ideals were the intellectual food of my youth, and to see 
America converted into a senseless, Old World conqueror, embitters my 
age.” He often hearkened back to coming over from Europe, decades 
before, fired with excitement about the massive, neutral, republican nation 
he was emigrating to. But he said that those ideals “are now all shattered 
and I have apparently to look elsewhere to keep even moderate hope about 
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the human race alive.”46 Godkin felt betrayed by his beloved, adopted 
nation’s failure to live up to its creeds, and to some extent disappointed in 
himself for failing to do more to prevent the slide. 
Godkin also had a ready ear to reinforce his disappointment. In his 
late, anti-imperialist years, Godkin was a close correspondent of Charles 
Eliot Norton, a Harvard professor of similar age and disposition. It was to 
Norton, as early as 1895, that Godkin made his dark prediction of a 
Roman Empire-style American collapse. Norton acknowledged and 
repeated Godkin’s prediction, and claimed that America would only be 
redeemed by a “calamity…nothing short of seven lean years, or the 
plagues of Egypt will make this nation serious, honest, full-grown, and 
civilized.”47 Both men only grew more pessimistic as events in the 
Philippines unfolded and they supported each other in the belief that the 
American experiment was at its end. 
Godkin was a racist in a specifically elitist way. For instance, 
Godkin looked down on many immigrant groups, saying that ignorant 
immigrant voters were “eating away the political structure, like a white 
ant, with a group of natives standing over him and encouraging him.” By 
1891, Godkin was pushing for English language literacy tests for all 
immigrants to America. He acknowledged that this would limit migration 
to primarily the British Isles, but wondered “why not, if the restriction be 
really undertaken in the interest of American civilization? We are under 
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no obligation to see that all races and nations enjoy an equal chance of 
getting here.” He was prejudiced against race to the extent that he 
considered certain races more prone to poverty and a lack of education.48  
Of course, Godkin himself had immigrated to America years 
before, but he came with a great deal of education and financial security. 
Godkin saw no contradiction in his own support for more restrictive 
immigration policy because he was exactly the kind of immigrant that he 
would encourage to settle in the United States, and saw nothing of himself 
in poorer, non-English speaking migrants. 
A November 1898 editorial page of The Nation neatly summed 
Godkin’s problem with Philippine annexation: “We simply point out that 
its acquisition would mean the incorporation into our system of an 
immense group of islands on the other side of the globe, occupied by eight 
millions of people of various races, that are for the most part either savage 
or but half-civilized; which the most ardent advocate of the policy admits 
can never become States of the Union.”49 Taking the Philippines, said 
Godkin, was plain and unvarnished imperialism, and that went against his 
elitism, his idealism, and every other view he held. 
By late 1899, Godkin was fully retired from the Evening Post, 
sixty-eight years old, and in poor health. In the middle of 1901, his health 
forced him to stop writing completely. Claiming that he could not let 
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himself die in the America of the time, he went back to England, dying 
there instead, on May 21st, 1902. 50 
 
* * * * * 
 
Carl Schurz was born on March 2nd, 1829, in Liblar (near 
Cologne), the son of a schoolmaster, and a subject of the Kingdom of 
Prussia. He excelled in school, took piano lessons, went on to the 
gymnasium at Cologne and then matriculated at the university at Bonn, 
and quickly established himself among the pro-republican and pro-
unification movements of late-1840s Germany.51 
At age eighteen, Schurz had resolved that he would “at least be a 
citizen of free America” if he could not “be the citizen of a free 
Germany.”52 He proved his commitment to this idea when he left 
Germany. At university Schurz was secretary of a pro-republican group 
called the Democratic Society; he joined a revolutionary military unit in 
the Revolutions of 1849, and ended up charged with treason and fleeing 
his native Prussia in disguise once democratic revolt failed. Escaping 
initially to Switzerland, Schurz returned to Berlin to break his mentor, 
Gottfried Kinkel, out of prison, then went to London for a brief time 
before heading across the Atlantic in September of 1852.53 As an 
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American, Schurz became the political voice of the German-American 
community, a Civil War general, a Senator, Hayes’ Secretary of the 
Interior, and one of the key supporters of Lincoln and later of the 
Mugwump faction and of conscientious political independence. 
Throughout his political life in America, Schurz was caustically 
independent, attaching himself to no party or place if it conflicted with his 
deeply held beliefs. He began in Wisconsin, went to New York and 
Missouri and Europe, and traveled widely, lecturing and writing. An early 
member of the Republican Party, Schurz was a longtime and zealous 
Lincoln supporter who later served a term as a Senator for Missouri and 
became Secretary of the Interior under Hayes.54 However, by 1884, 
Schurz was firmly a Mugwump. After failing to reform the Republicans, 
which he thought they needed, Schurz was campaigning against James G. 
Blaine and saying that the Party, once “the standard-bearer of National 
honor,” was no longer the grand, principled party “I have been serving.”55 
Schurz was an idealist to the end, and when the Republicans failed his 
standards, and the Democrats presented little better to him, he opted to go 
it alone rather than compromise. Summing himself up, in reference to 
Senator Oliver Morton, Schurz said that “[Morton] has never left his party. 
I have never betrayed my principles. That is the difference between him 
and me.”56 
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By the time the Philippine issue came up, Schurz still had the 
energy and will for the fight and stood firm on his position that 
imperialism was a mistake. As early as 1871, Schurz was opposing 
Grant’s attempts to take Santo Domingo, leading the efforts in the Senate 
that successfully rejected the annexation treaty, and receiving Grant’s 
public blame for the annexation effort’s defeat.57 Schurz continued to 
stand against island-grabbing expansion, opposing Hawaiian annexation 
when it was proposed in 1897, and arguing against fighting the Spanish-
American War.58 Writing to McKinley once the war had begun and 
Hawaiian annexation was rumored to be back on the table, he warned 
against annexing the islands for fear of hurting America’s reputation in the 
world. “It will be in vain to say that for the purposes of the war we must 
have a naval station in Hawaii, for the world knows that we own Pearl 
Harbor, which we can use as a naval station without annexing Hawaii. The 
annexation of Hawaii under such circumstances would therefore merely be 
an acquisition of territory by means of this war. From that time on it 
would be useless to protest that this is not a war of selfish ambition and 
conquest.”59 Schurz believed that American moral authority would be 
ruined by the immoral conquest of far-off islands for its own gain. This 
same argument was essential to Schurz’s argument against Philippine 
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annexation, and was essentially his stand against annexing Santo 
Domingo, repeated and adjusted.60  
Though Schurz was strong in his convictions, he was outside of the 
power structure in government. He gave speeches often, wrote editorials 
for publications like Harper’s Weekly, and put himself in personal 
correspondence with whomever he thought he could persuade. But Schurz 
was too much of a Mugwump for McKinley’s Republicans, too committed 
to sound money policies to align himself with any but Cleveland’s faction 
of the Democrats, and Schurz had the trust of neither party’s leadership. 
He was essentially an outspoken, prestigious, private citizen by the late 
1890s, not interested in running for office again, no longer influential 
enough to organize the German-American community into a personal 
constituency. And though he had made himself into a journalist after 
leaving Hayes’ cabinet, he had given up editorship of St. Louis’ Westliche 
Post in order to run the New York Evening Post with Godkin and Horace 
White in 1881, and then left that journal after a few years because of 
disagreements with his partners. Schurz remained in New York, without 
constituency or regular leadership duties, writing some historical works, 
and doing some campaigning for figures he supported and getting to know 
various luminaries of Manhattan and the area. However, without the 
chance to set government policy or have a major effect on the public’s 
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opinion, all Schurz could do against the growth of American imperialism 
was rally specific people against it.61 
Nevertheless, Schurz’s argument, though limited in its impact, was 
a clear one. On principle, a principle he did not change as the years and 
islands did, Schurz saw the excitement about conquering faraway islands 
as a dangerous twisting of patriotism. Writing as Congress considered 
resolutions for war, Schurz laid out his idea of patriotism:  
“It should be constantly remembered 
that to ‘serve one’s country faithfully’ means 
not only to profess love for it, or to have a 
sentimental attachment to it, but  to consider 
with conscientious care what is best for its 
welfare and its honor, and then to do one’s duty 
to it according to that understanding… The man 
who in times of popular excitement boldly and 
unflinchingly resists hot-tempered clamor for an 
unnecessary war, and thus exposes himself to 
the opprobrious imputation of a lack of 
patriotism or of courage, to the end of saving his 
country from a great calamity, is, as to ‘loving 
and faithfully serving his country,’ as least as 
good a patriot as the hero of the most daring feat 
of arms, and a far better one than those who, 
with an ostentatious pretense of superior 
patriotism, cry for war before it is needed, 
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especially if then they let others do the 
fighting.”62 
 
Schurz further argued that American principles required that, if the 
islands were made into American territory, they would necessarily have to 
become states, which would have a terribly detrimental effect on 
American government and society due to the islands’ racial makeup.63 
Schurz warned that “if they become states on an equal footing with the 
other states,” governing themselves and influencing the federal 
government, a prospect Schurz found “so alarming that you instinctively 
pause before taking the step.”64 Schurz warned that the electoral votes of 
the islands, however few they were, would have a major impact on the 
often-closely-contested national election races and Congressional votes 
that affect the whole country. And he argued that those who wished to 
annex an island because its people could not govern themselves were 
backing a foolish philosophy where, “in other words, if the Cubans are 
hopelessly incapable of orderly self-government, we must permit them to 
help govern our own country.” Schurz predicted that pursuing such a 
policy would lead eventually to “the moral ruin of the Anglo-Saxon 
republic.”65 
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Schurz was practical enough, however, to see that what American 
principles required would be violated by McKinley’s government in how 
they held onto the Philippines. Schurz said that, if kept, the admission of 
the Philippines and other islands as states, or as he put it “the 
transformation of ‘the United States of America’ into ‘the United States of 
America and Asia,’” would never happen. He accurately predicted that the 
annexed Philippines would become colonies, without real representation 
in Washington. “This means government without the consent of the 
governed. It means taxation without representation. It means the very 
things against which the Declaration of Independence remonstrated, and 
against which the Fathers rose in revolution.”66 Contrary to the imperialist 
belief that annexing the Philippines would allow Americans to lift up the 
Filipinos, Schurz argued that taking the islands would make Americans a 
lesser people. “It will only be the old tale of a free people seduced by false 
ambitions and running headlong after riches and luxuries and military 
glory, and then down the fatal slope into vice, corruption, decay and 
disgrace. The tale will be more ignominious and mournful this time, 
because the opportunities had been more magnificent, the fall more rapid 
and the failure more shameful and discouraging than ever before in 
history.”67 
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Schurz warned anyone he could that a policy of imperialism would 
ruin the republican government of the United States. In his letters, he 
predicted “that this Republic…can endure so long as it remains true to the 
principles upon which it was founded, but that it will morally decay if it 
abandons them. I believe that this democracy, the government of, by and 
for the people, is not fitted for a colonial policy, which means conquest by 
force…and arbitrary rule over subject populations.” Schurz also saw 
America as the nation with the greatest chance of accomplishing 
successful democratic government and spreading it around the world, but 
“if [the United States] attempts such a [colonial] policy on a large scale, its 
inevitable degeneracy will hurt the progress of civilization more than it 
can possibly further that progress by planting its flag upon foreign soil on 
which its fundamental principles of government cannot live.”68 He saw the 
issue as larger than just an American one; it was a battle for democracy 
itself, because Schurz believed that a democracy could not “play the king 
over subject populations without creating in itself ways of thinking and 
habits of action most dangerous to its own vitality.”69 
Schurz’s practical solution to the problem of the Philippines was 
international arbitration. In June of 1898, he wrote to McKinley that “if we 
turn this war, which was heralded to the world as a war of humanity, in 
any sense into a war of conquest, we shall forever forfeit the confidence of 
mankind.” Schurz recommended making Cuba and PR independent, and 
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suggested that America “dispose of the Philippines…to some Power that is 
not likely to excite especial jealousy, such as Holland or Belgium” to 
maintain America in “the position of the great neutral Power of the 
world” (italics his). Schurz said this would be good for democracy, keep 
the military budget down, avoid “burdensome political responsibilities,” 
and be commercially profitable. Thus, he said his suggested policy was 
“not a merely idealistic one. It suits this Republic best morally as well as 
materially.”70  
Since the Venezuelan boundary dispute, Schurz had pushed for 
arbitration as a general solution to issues between America and its 
neighbors. Speaking before the New York Chamber of Commerce in 
January of 1896, Schurz explained that “to show that arbitration is 
preferable to war, should be among civilized people as superfluous as to 
show that to refer disputes between individuals or associations to courts of 
justice is better than to refer them to single combat or to street fights—in 
one word, that the ways of civilization are preferable to those of 
barbarism. … In this century not less than eighty controversies between 
civilized Powers have been composed by arbitration. And more than that. 
Every international dispute settled by arbitration has stayed settled, while 
during the same period some of the results of great wars have not stayed 
settled, and others are unceasingly drawn in question, being subject to the 
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shifting preponderance of power.”71 Shortly after the speech, Schurz 
worked with Andrew Carnegie to try to arrange an arbitration treaty with 
the British for the issue.72 Schurz also traveled to the nation’s capital a few 
months later, lending his support to the cause of arbitration. “I am 
confident our strongest, most effective, most trustworthy and infinitely the 
cheapest coast defense will consist in ‘Fort Justice,’ ‘Fort Good Sense,’ 
‘Fort Self-Respect,’ ‘Fort Good-will’ and if international differences really 
do arise, ‘Fort Arbitration.’… This Republic can have no other armament 
as effective as the weapons of peace.“73 
At the outbreak of the Philippine insurrection, however, Schurz 
stopped calling for arbitration. He said that America’s “war of barefaced, 
cynical conquest” in the islands needed to end, and that the solution would 
be full, immediate Philippine independence under American military 
protection. This suggestion received little attention, and its opponents 
countered that the United States had might as well take complete authority 
over the islands if it were taking the trouble to protect them from another 
power snapping them up. As Henry Cabot Lodge put it, “[I]f we are to 
have the responsibility, we will have the power that goes with it.”74 
Schurz had to unhappily turned his back on men like Lodge and 
Theodore Roosevelt, whom he had previously liked greatly, as they 
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aligned themselves with McKinley and with Mahanian expansionism. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, in his highly influential work The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History (1890), had argued that a great power required a 
great naval fleet to protect and preserve itself, and pushed for the United 
States to build up its navy immediately. Mahan also framed the progress 
of history as a struggle between civilization and savagery and argued that 
civilized nations like America needed strong armed forces to defeat the 
savages.75 This imperialism was also bound up in a push to keep American 
men masculine: Henry Cabot Lodge would say war could maintain “an 
unconquerable energy, a very great initiative,” and “an absolute empire 
over self” among men, and Mahan himself feared that womens’ suffrage 
would harm the “constant practice of the past ages by which to men are 
assigned the outdoor rough action of life” while women stayed in the 
home.76 For his part, Schurz had little to do with sexism. He supported his 
wife Margarethe in her pioneering work establishing American 
kindergartens and had close relationships with thinkers and figures of both 
genders throughout his life.77 
Teddy Roosevelt, a firm believer in Mahan’s theories, argued to 
Schurz that the righteousness of the American cause against the Spanish 
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took precedence over peace.78 In Roosevelt’s case, Schurz admired his 
intelligence and willingness to fight, but had to face the truth, “that Mr. 
Roosevelt has always with perfect frankness confessed himself to be what 
is currently called a jingo. …almost all the zealous advocates of a great 
war-fleet belong to the jingo class, many of whom are not nearly as honest 
and unselfish as Mr. Roosevelt is, and would hesitate little to drive their 
country into a war with some foreign Power without necessity.” Schurz 
cleverly argued that Roosevelt, by supporting the Mahanian argument of a 
great fleet as a deterrent to warfare, as well as the jingoistic belief that 
peace made the American people weaker, was hoping for an expensive 
fleet that would make the country weakly pacifistic.79 Schurz would also 
unsuccessfully oppose Roosevelt’s run for Governor of New York in 
1898, an electoral triumph that would lead to Roosevelt’s nomination as 
Vice President in 1900, and eventual Presidency.80 
Schurz disputed the imperialist, Mahanian claim that commerce 
would follow the American flag. He argued that America “should not 
annex, but secure the opening to our activities of the territories 
concerned,” and pointed out that trade with new places could be done 
without conquering them. Can new markets, Schurz wondered, “be opened 
only by annexing to the United States the countries in which they are 
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situated?”81 In another address, Schurz cited a statistical decline in 
American maritime trade, saying that the value of foreign trade carried out 
in American ships was 82% in 1846 and 65% by 1861; it fell to 28% after 
the Civil War and was at 12% by 1896. Schurz claimed that American 
trade was fine in the early days when the United States had no naval 
power, but had fallen because America had plenty of wooden sailing ships 
but failed to build iron steamships, and that “to raise that commerce to its 
old superiority again, we want not more warships, but more merchant 
vessels” (italics are Schurz’s). He said that American capital needed to be 
applied to building such ships, and that “to make such a policy fruitful, we 
need above all things peace.” And as to the common imperialist claim that 
warfare would invigorate American businessmen and businesses, Schurz 
wondered, “would not that be as wise and moral as a proposition to burn 
down our cities for the purpose of giving the masons and carpenters 
something to do? … But the thought of plotting in cold blood to break the 
peace of the country and to send thousands of our youths to slaughter and 
to desolate thousands of American homes for an object of internal 
policy…is so abominable, so ghastly, so appalling, that I dismiss it as 
impossible of belief.”82 
Schurz held certain pseudoscientific conclusions about climate that 
led him to be racist. Schurz’s biographer, Hans L. Trefousse, claims that 
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Schurz was “never a racist in modern terms,” but thought “the tropics 
tended to be debilitating.”83 Schurz certainly did blame what he 
considered weaknesses in the character and intelligence of “Malays, 
Tagals, Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, Negritos, and various more or less 
barbarous tribes” upon their being “situated in the tropics, where people of 
the northern races, such as Anglo-Saxons, or generally speaking, people of 
Germanic blood, have never migrated in mass to stay.”84 Nevertheless, 
Schurz had worked hard to support Reconstruction, constantly arguing 
with then-President Johnson about the worth of the cause of black 
suffrage, and making a marathon 1865 tour of the postwar South and an 
exhaustive report to Congress that successfully countered Grant’s claims 
that Reconstruction was complete and that black voting rights and 
personal safety no longer needed the government’s protection.85  
However, in his arguments against annexing the Philippines, 
especially as the cause looked more and more dire, Schurz was not above 
relying on racial themes to make his argument. He explained to one 
audience that “their population consists in Cuba and Porto Rico [sic] of 
Spanish creoles and of people of negro blood, with some native Spaniards 
and a slight sprinkling of North Americans, English, Germans and French; 
in the Philippines of a large mass of more or less barbarous Asiatics, 
descendants of Spaniards, mixtures of Asiatic and Spanish blood, a 
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number of natives of Spain and a very few persons of northern races,” and 
claimed there was not a single instance of a nation of such people properly 
running a democracy. What would happen to American government, 
Schurz wondered, with “the incorporation in our body-politic of millions 
of persons belonging partly to races far less good-natured, tractable and 
orderly than the negro is?”86 If Schurz felt any strangeness about speaking 
negatively of black Americans he had once championed suffrage for, he 
did not demonstrate it in the speech. The next month, September of 1898, 
Schurz wrote of the United States being overwhelmed by “immense 
territories inhabited by white people of Spanish descent, by Indians, 
negroes, mixed Spanish and Indians, mixed Spanish and negroes, 
Hawaiians, Hawaiian mixed blood, Spanish Filipinos, Malays, Tagals, 
various kinds of savages and half-savages, not to mention the Chinese and 
Japanese—at least twenty-five millions in all,” a burden to the America of 
the near future that might be foolish enough to take them in.87 These 
arguments all came in the fall of 1898, a critical time for the anti-
imperialist cause. It was not in Schurz’s character to change his 
convictions without cause, but the importance of the issue might have 
pushed him to use less than enlightened arguments about racial fitness to 
make his point.88 
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Schurz’s was neither a pacifist nor unwilling to expand the 
country. He had fought with valor in Germany as a young man and in the 
American Civil War as a Major General in the Union Army, believing in 
both instances that those causes were worth fighting for. Schurz’s Civil 
War record, particularly his division’s defeat at Chancellorsville, was 
derided by political opponents for the rest of his career, something that 
Schurz grappled with as the imperialists tried to claim that the strength and 
masculinity of both sides of the War Between the States was a tradition 
that their island-grabbing carried on.89 He stated, as early as the 
Venezuelan border dispute and much more often, that “I am for peace—
not, indeed, peace at any price, but peace with honor.”90 And even in the 
build-up to war with Spain, Schurz affirmed that, if war is declared, 
“patriotism then demands that we should all unite with the same faithful 
devotion in doing the best we can to make the shortest possible work of 
the struggle, and to secure a speedy issue honorable and advantageous to 
our country.”91 But Schurz saw the methods used by Americans in the 
Philippines, and the addition of large tropical regions by conquest, as 
immoral and un-American. Nothing was more repugnant to Schurz than a 
war of choice, and  he believed that Americans were “in our continental 
position, substantially unassailable. … No foreign Power or possible 
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combination in the old world can, therefore, considering…the precarious 
relations of every one of them with other Powers and its various exposed 
interests, have the slightest inclination to get into a war with the United 
States, and none of the will, unless we force it to do so.”92 Only by 
jingoism and threats, pushing other countries “into [war] by making it to 
them a matter of plain self-respect,” would foreign nations attack the 
United States. If America chose to have peace, Schurz believed, it could 
happily have it.93 
Though Schurz opposed taking the Philippines and other island 
regions, he did favor annexing part or all of Canada, because he 
considered its Anglo-Saxon peoples and cold climate a good match for 
American society.94 In private letters to Goldwin Smith, a British-
Canadian journalist who argued for “Continental Union” between the 
United States and Canada, Schurz expressed his sympathy for the idea and 
feared that America’s possessing far-flung islands full of “colored” races 
would make Canadians less interested in uniting with the United States.95 
Still, though he accepted certain wars and expansions, annexing the 
Philippines did not meet his standards in either way, and Schurz readily 
joined the American Anti-Imperialist League. 
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Schurz joined the Anti-Imperialist League because he felt the 
Philippine issue was a crucial one. He saw the question of what to do with 
American war gains, especially the Philippines, as a crossroads for 
“determining whether [the American people] will continue the traditional 
policy under which they have achieved their present prosperity, greatness 
and power, or whether they will adopt a new course, the issue of which is, 
to say the least, highly problematical, and which, if once entered upon, 
can…never be retraced.”96 It was Schurz’s belief that the Republicans of 
McKinley and Mahan had to be stopped; otherwise, America would 
become an imperial power like those in Western Europe. In a private 
letter, he claimed that “the only thing that can save the Republic from 
being rushed over the precipice is the defeat in the coming election of all, 
or nearly all, of the Republican candidates, either for State offices or for 
Congress, who have conspicuously come out in favor of that expansion 
policy. Such a defeat may bring the Administration as well as Congress to 
a sober consideration of the question, if anything can.”97 He thought 
holding up the Treaty of Paris in the Senate would provoke a real 
examination of the issues of imperialism, but if enough Republicans were 
in office, he expected that the Treaty would pass with little opposition.  
Schurz hoped that the American people, speaking via the ballot, 
could elect enough anti-imperialist representatives to prevent the Treaty’s 
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passage. In June of 1898, he wrote to McKinley of his travels through the 
West and experiences in New York, all pointing toward popular dislike of 
the war with Spain, and Schurz predicted that if McKinley did not prevent 
a war, then it would be difficult for the President to “guide and save the 
Republican party” in the coming elections.98 Whether this was what 
Schurz truly observed or an argument to influence McKinley, Schurz did 
believe that if the issue could be put to a plebiscite, it would be handily 
defeated, and he encouraged Senator George Frisbie Hoar of 
Massachusetts to lead an effort to arrange one.99 Schurz hoped and 
believed that America’s people would ignore the appeal of Manifest 
Destiny, “a counsel which, in seeking to unload upon Providence the 
responsibility for schemes of reckless ambition involving a palpable 
breach of faith, falls little short of downright blasphemy.”100  
Schurz had an idealistic belief in the democratic principles of 
American government. To him, this was more than just sentiment. 
Speaking in February of 1900, after the Philippine issue was already well 
on its way to its bloody conclusion, Schurz warned that violent, 
imperialistic behavior by the United States would weaken and destroy its 
better values. “Take away these conservative and ennobling influences,” 
he warned, “and the only motive forces left in such a democracy will be 
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greed and passion. I can hardly imagine any kind of government more 
repellent than a democracy that has ceased to believe in anything.”101 And 
with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris on February 6th, 1899, and the 
ensuing bloodshed and cruelty of the Philippine insurrection, Schurz felt 
that his fear of repellent American democracy had come to pass. 
In the end, the Anti-Imperialist League lost and was later 
disbanded, and Schurz was defeated and depressed. Speaking near the end 
of his life in 1902, Schurz lamented the events involving the Philippines. 
He asked others to empathize: “…imagine the feelings of a man who all 
his life has struggled for human liberty and popular government…who 
believed he had found what he sought in this Republic…and who at last, at 
the close of his life, sees that beloved Republic in the clutches of sinister 
powers which seduce and betray it into an abandonment of its most sacred 
principles and traditions and push it into policies and practices even worse 
than those which once had had to flee from?”102 
 
* * * * * 
 
Andrew Carnegie was born in Dunfermline (near Edinburgh) in 
1835, the son of a weaver and, like Godkin, a British subject. He grew up 
in a family that emphasized Chartist politics and the sacred rights of the 
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common laborer while eschewing the close religious affiliations that 
defined much of Scottish society at the time.103 Young Andrew spent only 
the first twelve years of his life in Scotland, but those years were the 
crucible of his personal development. By the winter of 1847, 
Dunfermline’s damask industry was mostly mechanized, and Andrew’s 
father Will could no longer find work as a weaver.104 He got a little money 
for selling his looms, and Andrew’s mother Margaret got a loan of twenty 
pounds to cover the rest of the price for the transatlantic trip.105  
Once in America and settled in Allegheny City (later annexed by 
Pittsburgh), young Andrew went straight to work, first as a bobbin boy 
and later as a part-time bookkeeper. He received a few years of education 
before, in Dunfermline, at a school for children of the working poor. It 
was an education on the Lancastrian system, rooted in the tenets of mass 
production, and so the learning was by rote. Carnegie was a capable 
memorizer and picked up some knowledge of Scripture.106 Later in life, 
Carnegie would encourage scientific and technical training, but decry 
classical education as “almost fatal” to success in business. Though he 
sought education constantly later in his life, once the Carnegies arrived in 
America, young Andrew’s formal education was, in the short term, at an 
end.107  
                                                 
103 David Nasaw, Andrew Carnegie (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 1-23. 
104 Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie (1970; repr., Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 65-66. 
105 Nasaw, Andrew Carnegie, 23. 
106 Nasaw, Andrew Carnegie, 15-16, 26-35. 
107 Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 835. 
 42 
But Carnegie’s youth was never without higher ideas. William was 
active in the radical, pro-labor Chartist movement, presiding over the pro-
Chartism Nethertown Society from 1844 to 1846.108 This political 
activism trickled down to Andrew, but also kept William busy. Lucky for 
Andrew, his uncle George Lauder, a grocer, spent his spare time teaching 
his son George Jr. and his nephew Andrew the history of Britain, with a 
storyteller’s sense of its drama. Carnegie later wrote of how Lauder Sr. 
“taught us British history by imagining each of the monarchs in a certain 
place upon the walls of the room performing the act for which he was well 
known. Thus for me King John sits to this day above the mantelpiece 
signing the Magna Charta [sic], and Queen Victoria is in the back of the 
door with her children upon her knees.”109 Carnegie’s family also 
preached economic good sense, a distaste for overbearing class hierarchy, 
and a love of America, which, when tied up with this historical and 
political education from his father and uncle, did much to put Andrew on 
his eventual intellectual and philosophical path. Carnegie later wrote that 
“the denunciations of monarchical and aristocratic government, of 
privilege in all its forms, the grandeur of the republican system, the 
superiority of America, a land peopled by our own race, a home for 
freemen in which every citizen’s privilege was every man’s right—these 
were the exciting themes upon which I was nurtured.”110 
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Carnegie took to American life immediately. Still just in his late 
teens, he wrote in one of his many letters to “Dod” (his nickname for 
George Lauder Jr.) that America had “all your [Britain’s] good traits, 
which are many, with few or none of your bad ones which I must say are 
neither few nor far between. … We have the charter [for] which you have 
been fighting for years as the Panacea for all Britain’s woes, the bulwark 
of the liberties of the people.”111 Young and irrepressible, Carnegie began 
the long, challenging haul of building his steel company shortly after the 
Civil War, during which he helped direct railroad and telegraph operations 
in Pittsburgh for the Union’s War Department.112 But he would always 
believe that America, and its system, was the root of his own success. 
Carnegie often wrote essays and speeches, but only one book, Triumphant 
Democracy, a celebration of America and a prescription for Britain to 
imitate it. He considered himself yet another man inspired to greatness by 
the American principle of equality under the law for every citizen. 
Americans, he wrote, were “invested under the Republic with the mantle 
of sovereignty. The drowsy Briton becomes a force here.”113 And 
Carnegie’s chosen dedication for Triumphant Democracy was not to his 
father, uncle, or any other figure in his life, but to his chosen land: “To 
The BELOVED REPUBLIC under whose equal laws I am made the equal 
of any man, although denied political equality by my native land, I 
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DEDICATE THIS BOOK with an intensity of gratitude and admiration 
which the native-born citizen can neither feel nor understand.”114 Carnegie 
had not only built what became U.S. Steel but also lived as an example of 
what he thought the modern industrialist should be, and he considered 
himself indebted to America for the opportunities that allowed it. 
For Carnegie, this beloved nation was not an imperial one, and he 
consistently opposed such a policy. He had successfully lobbied President 
Grant not to annex Santo Domingo in the 1870s.115 Most wars of 
imperialism, by America or by other nations, rankled his practical sense of 
pacifism. And Carnegie’s response to the Venezuelan boundary crisis of 
1895 was in keeping with his established stance on American imperialism, 
but also reflected his fear of American imitation of Britain’s imperialistic 
foolishness, an aspect of Britain that Carnegie had no love for. As 
Carnegie wrote to the Duke of Devonshire, he felt that “the giant son is his 
mother’s child, down to the roots, and like her will boss things within 
what he feels to be his sphere of operations, which has rather indefinite, 
but which is rapidly extending. The present rupture will lead to a very 
large and powerful navy, and to coast defences, unless adjusted, and the 
bitterness with which England is now assailed, and the illwill which this 
trouble must leave behind it is really pitiable.”116 Carnegie was a critic of 
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the British colonization of India. He thought Britain destroyed India’s 
“native institutions” and had forced “her views upon an unwilling people 
wholly unprepared to receive them,” all to have the added trouble of 
running a place it just as easily could have traded with.117 Writing to 
Godkin, his fellow Briton, Carnegie wrote that there was “scarcely a 
statesman of Britain who does not say privately ‘Would that we were 
safely out of India!’ What does India do for England? Ask the desolate 
homes that I have known in Britain.”118  
Carnegie also opposed the interference of Britain, or any other 
power, in the Western Hemisphere, writing to James G. Blaine in 1882 
that the United States should have “no joint arrangements, no entangling 
alliances with monarchical, warlike Europe. America will take this 
Continent in hand alone.”119 On the matter of Latin America, Carnegie did 
not think the United States should colonize it. In the same letter to the 
Duke of Devonshire he cautions him to heed Disraeli’s opinion on 
colonies as “a millstone around England’s neck.”120 Instead, Carnegie 
thought America should nonviolently maintain the Western Hemisphere as 
its “sphere of operations” and that Europe would have to respect that U.S. 
influence.121 And Carnegie saw American action in the Western 
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Hemisphere only as justifiable and appropriate, so long as the United 
States stayed out of the Old World’s affairs. 
By the time that Philippine annexation was an issue, Carnegie was 
a luminary in two nations, one of America’s foremost businessmen, but 
often crossing the Atlantic to be back in Scotland. Carnegie was traveling 
Europe with his family as the Spanish-American War broke out and did 
not break his plan to arrive at his new home in Scotland, at Skibo Castle, 
in May 1898.122 He followed the events of the war closely from Skibo, and 
corresponded whenever he felt it necessary, but did not think the issues of 
what to do with captured Spanish possessions would be urgent for another 
few months. As he wrote to Dr. Adolf Gurlt on June 1st, “If I felt that I 
could be of the slightest use just now in closing the deplorable war 
between poor mistaken Spain and the United States, I assure you my voice 
would not be silent nor my pen be idle. … When the proper time comes, 
when I can urge liberal treatment of Spain and the surrender of the 
Phillipines [sic], believe me you shall again find me, as you say you did 
before, pleading for the right in the North American Review and 
elsewhere.”123 Carnegie also celebrated McKinley’s initial promise to 
leave Cuba free and unmolested, circulating a pamphlet predicting that 
“the brightest page of the Republic’s history as seen a thousand years 
hence will be that which recalls the President’s stand for the independence 
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of Cuba.”124 Carnegie would argue, and argue strongly, against America’s 
actions in Cuba and elsewhere, but later on. 
In practical terms, Carnegie saw no real commercial benefit to 
McKinley’s policy. He wrote to the New York World in November, 
claiming, as Schurz did, that commerce would not follow the flag, citing 
figures for previous American exports to the Philippines, when only Spain 
enjoyed a tariff advantage, which were so negligible as to be lumped in 
with the exports “from all other nations” in the report. He said that 
America’s distance from the Philippines meant exporting there was 
unprofitable for America without an unfair tariff barrier to other nations, 
but that such an unfair barrier would bring down the combined wrath of 
other nations, forcing McKinley to adopt an “open door” policy for the 
territory. Carnegie believed that “the men in Washington today…have 
eaten upon the insane root of territorial expansion in distant continents; 
they are dreaming dreams, chasing phantoms, and in one stroke of the pen 
the President of the United States has innocently given over the trade of 
the Philippines to foreign nations. I do not believe that he ever thought of 
distance. … [McKinley] had the ‘open door’ before except in competition 
with Spain. … Thus the claims of the imperialists that foreign acquisitions 
extend our commerce with the Philippines is groundless. … Strange day’s 
work this for an American President, who against the commerce 
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destroyers of his country should ‘have barred the door, not borne the knife 
himself.’”125  
Carnegie, never one to be bashful, informed McKinley and his 
Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson, of further economic reasons to 
avoid annexing the Philippines. He suggested to Wilson that Australian 
farmers, rather than American ones, would profit from feeding an 
American army in the islands, and that American farmers would be 
unhappy when they realized it.126 Wilson could not debate the merits of 
the argument, but replied that “I am very familiar with the sentiment of the 
farmers in the west, and it is simply this: They are a Christian people, and 
they pity the people of the Philippine islands; and they do not think these 
islands should be given back to Spain.” He also warned Carnegie that the 
major Anti-Imperialist figures would not be enough to convince the people 
of it.127 
In his same New York World editorial of November 27th, Carnegie 
also figured an approximate cost of $100,000,000 per year for America to 
maintain the army and navy necessary to keep the Philippines. He 
lamented McKinley’s foolishness in burdening the country so badly 
financially: “Ah, Mr. President, little did you know what leaving the 
teaching of the fathers meant when you rashly abandoned it and entered 
upon your new and thorny path. What would you not give to get back 
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again to the true American ideals?”128 Carnegie wrote to the New York 
Sun, a paper he often chastised for its support of McKinley and 
imperialism, that one reason he opposed Philippine annexation was that 
“we have 81 warships and need the protection of Great Britian with her 
528, against France with her 403, Russia 286, and Germany with her 
216.”129 How, asked Carnegie, could America afford to spend so much 
money and manpower defending its unprofitable investment against the 
depradations of more heavily armed and aggressive powers? He also 
feared for the troops themselves, citing the high probability of either 
insurgents or malaria killing American soldiers, and remarked, “so much 
for this coveted possession for which President McKinley invites us to pay 
twenty millions of dollars and perhaps spend a thousand millions shooting 
down the natives in order to impose upon them our foreign yoke against 
their desire.”130 
Carnegie opposed imperialism for idealistic reasons too. Unlike 
some anti-imperialists, he was not truly a pacifist, though he opposed wars 
in general, with the notable exception of the American Civil War, when he 
wrote to Dod that slavery was “the greatest evil in the world” and hoped 
for the crushing defeat of the Confederacy.131 Carnegie’s otherwise 
consistent pacifism was, like his anti-imperialism, based on a mix of 
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idealism and practicality. He hoped that America could be a proponent of 
world peace, supported many American and British peace organizations, 
and gave ten million dollars to the Endowment for International Peace in 
1910. But Carnegie, ever the businessman, also saw extensive military 
spending as terribly wasteful. He wrote that he hoped the United States 
would “prove worthy of all [its] blessings and show to the world that after 
ages of wars and conquests there comes at last to the troubled earth the 
glorious reign of peace. But no new steel cruisers, no standing army. 
These are the devil’s tools in monarchies; the Republic’s weapons are the 
ploughshare and the pruning hook.” Carnegie’s higher hopes and simpler 
business sense both led him to believe that America was lucky to have 
“the poorest navy and smallest army” in the world, because with such 
token forces it could more ably promote the cause of world peace.132 
And Carnegie saw worse costs to the country from an imperialistic 
policy. As he wrote in a later letter to the World, “[J]ust as pecuniary cost 
cannot be estimated, neither can the more serious loss to the nation which 
must come from substituting Militarism for Industrialism. The former 
tends to weaken those influences which make for better things, a higher 
civilization. It lowers the standard of national life as it lowers the ideals of 
a nation. This is to be the greatest cost of all.”133 Writing in February, with 
the cause against the treaty almost lost, Carnegie lamented how “the 
influence of a superior race upon an inferior race in the tropics is injurious, 
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demoralizing. There is no basis for the claim that American troops in the 
Philippines can be of service as missionaries; on the contrary troops as a 
rule require missionaries themselves.”134 
Carnegie also deeply believed, as Schurz did, that if the American 
public really had their say, they would broadly oppose the imperialism of 
McKinley. Before the Philippine mess was even a possibility, Carnegie 
wrote in Triumphant Democracy that “the American people are satisfied 
that the worst native government in the world is better for its people than 
the best government which any foreign power can supply. … They are 
further satisfied that, in the end, more speed is made in developing and 
improving backward races by proving to them through example the 
advantages of Democratic institutions than is possible through violent 
interference. The man in America who should preach that the nation 
should interfere with distant races for their civilization, and for their good, 
would be voted either a fool or a hypocrite.”135 He stood by this opinion in 
the specific case of the Philippines, writing in a New Year’s Eve 1898 
editorial that “if we could only get a plebiscite of the people, Imperialism 
would be overwhelmingly overthrown. The votes are with us. Either 
through, or over the Republican party, the ship of state will be turned 
round from the ‘deep waters’ into which you suggest she is heading and 
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sailed safely back to safety in the harbor of Americanism.”136 In another 
editorial, Carnegie celebrated the fact that “the votes are against 
imperialism. Labor has spoken from farm, workshop and mine.”137 Till the 
end, Carnegie believed in the will of the people of the United States to 
prevent the tide of imperialism. In December 1898, Carnegie urged Schurz 
to “not lose faith in the Republic or in Triumphant Democracy. It is sound 
to the core.”138  
Even after the Treaty was ratified, Carnegie did not immediately 
lose hope. Expecting McKinley to backpedal, Carnegie wrote to Dod that 
he was “wrong about Phillipines [sic] – President now considering how to 
get out – no colonies for the Republic – Keep this for reference & know 
there’s a prophet in the family.”139 He rebuffed the depressed Schurz, 
writing that “many of the Senators who voted for the Treaty are with us, 
and the President has been told this. I am certain as ever that Imperialism 
is defeated.” But McKinley would soon claim that the Philippines, like 
Cuba and Puerto Rico, were entrusted to the United States by war, over 
Carnegie’s protestations that they “have been ‘intrusted [sic] to us’ solely 
by the unexpected demand for them made by the President himself.”140  
The whole process of taking the Philippines embittered Carnegie. 
Invited to attend a reception for the American Philippine Commission in 
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December of 1898, he replied sarcastically: “Unfortunately I shall be in 
Pittsburgh the evening of your reception to the signers of the War Treaty 
with Spain, not the Peace. It is a matter of congratulation however that you 
seem to have about finished your work of civilizing the Fillipinos [sic]. It 
is thought that about 8000 of them have been completely civilized and sent 
to Heaven. I hope you like it.”141 But in the months after ratification of the 
Treaty, as the Philippine-American War began and raged, Carnegie 
stopped his vigorous campaign in correspondence and in the newspapers. 
Perhaps it was related to his retirement from actively running his beloved 
company, in May of 1899.142 Either way, Carnegie stopped his fight for 
the Philippines, as many of the other Anti-Imperialist League members did 
by mid-to-late 1899. 
Carnegie did not gel with all the other anti-imperialists on most 
issues, in particular economic ones. He and William Jennings Bryan, for 
instance, conflicted on the free silver issue so strongly that it dashed any 
hopes of their uniting. Carnegie began a correspondence with Bryan by 
December of 1898, considering the possibility of Carnegie’s lending his 
support to the pro-silver, populist Democrat in the coming presidential 
election. But Bryan avoided any official endorsement from Carnegie; he 
had not yet officially decided whether to run against McKinley again and 
wrote to Carnegie that he would be “making this fight in my own way & 
hope to see the question disposed of before 1900 so that the fight for silver 
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& against trust & bank notes may be continued.”143 Eventually Carnegie, 
who had called Bryan a “light-headed-blathering demagogue” while 
supporting McKinley in 1896, decided not to support Bryan, especially 
after Bryan supported ratifying the Treaty of Paris in the hopes that the 
anti-imperialists could win out afterwards.144 Writing to John Hay, 
Carnegie worried that “[Bryan’s] right anent Americanism – but unless he 
drops silver – and goes in for that alone small army and navy, low taxes – 
he has no chance.” Carnegie did think that the Democrats would drop 
silver and defeat the Republicans, but this did not come to pass.145 There 
was also Godkin, with whom Carnegie did not greatly disagree on free 
trade, but who, to Carnegie, still seemed to be too distracted by 
protectionism to effectively stand against imperialism. Writing to Godkin, 
Carnegie suggested that “you and I agree that there is only one grave 
danger before the Republic at present. If so should we not concentrate 
upon that and use all means to defeat it….I pray you get the importance of 
Protection our of your mind and relegate it to the people it deserves.”146 
For Carnegie, the best kind of anti-imperialist was a man like Schurz: 
staunch, vocal, an independent Mugwump Republican, and a long-time 
backer of sound money…in other words, a man like Carnegie himself. 
Carnegie lunched and spoke with Schurz often around this time, and wrote 
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to him that “if we could have a hundred bold men in public life like 
yourself, it would be better for the Republic.”147 Schurz felt similarly 
about Carnegie, writing to the steel magnate that his work made him “the 
leader of the Anti-Imperialist Movement,” and said Carnegie should “take 
active charge at once” of the whole organization.148 
Carnegie’s vision for America, if not imperialism, was a Pan-
Anglian one. Though he disliked much of Britain’s own often violent 
colonial imperialism, Carnegie spoke with enthusiasm of what he called 
“race imperialism” as early as 1853, writing that he hoped “the Banner of 
St. George and the Stars and Stripes” would fight “side by side” to spread 
democratic ideals. He even had a specially designed flag, with each 
nation’s flag on one of its sides, made to fly over his home at Skibo.149 
Carnegie believed that America had a superior system, but that an Anglo-
Saxon nation like Britain would be a perfect partner for the Anglo-Saxon 
United States in the world. He wrote to William Gladstone that Britain had 
to Americanize to keep up, otherwise Britain would become like a 
forgotten state of the Union, Greece to America’s Rome, “the headquarters 
of its culture, its institutions, the place from which great ideas would 
flow,” and “the garden and pleasure ground of the race.”150 This all fit 
Carnegie’s belief in the American system and in its personal liberties as 
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the greatest possible social order.151 And he was in touch, as Schurz was, 
with Pan-Anglianists like Goldwin Smith, who hoped that anti-
imperialism could win out, and that men like Carnegie would “yet save the 
American Commonwealth, the core version of which by a mere impulse of 
vanity into a bad imitation of the militarist and land-grabbing powers of 
the old world would be one of the great disasters of history.”152 And if 
greater alliance with Britain could not immediately happen, Carnegie at 
least hoped that both nations could cultivate their own areas. For instance, 
he publicly argued in August of 1898 that America should trade its newly, 
almost accidentally acquired Philippines to Britain, in exchange for 
Britain’s Caribbean possessions, thus helping both countries.153 Carnegie 
could not singlehandedly deliver America from the problem of what to do 
with the Philippines, and stories of Carnegie’s offering to pay the federal 
government twenty million dollars for their independence are apocryphal 
(though Carnegie never went out of his way to deny them).154 
Nevertheless, he hoped that greater partnership with Britain, in this and 
other areas, might help to improve both nations and let Anglo-Saxon 
democracy lead the world. 
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Carnegie was like many other anti-imperialists in the vehemence 
of his opposition to acquiring the Philippines, but was not so anti-imperial 
in other areas. He admitted that Hawaii was the only place from which the 
continental United States could be attacked from the west, saw Puerto 
Rico as strategically useful for the American navy, and thought Cuban 
sugar interests would make unignorable demands for annexation of the 
island.155 And Carnegie took offense at claims in the New York Sun that he 
was a total anti-imperialist, affirming that he favored continental 
expansion to places where he felt Americans could live, which just did not 
include the islands.156 However, like many anti-imperialists, Carnegie 
feared that an American Philippines would mean much larger, farther-
reaching responsibilities. Carnegie’s idealism was merely against 
Philippine annexation, but his practical side was horrified by it. The 
forcefulness of his opposition shocked friends and colleagues deeply, such 
as his friend John Hay, who wrote to their mutual friend Whitelaw Reid 
that “Andrew Carnegie really seems to be off his head. He writes me 
frantic letters signing them ‘Your Bitterest Opponent’… He says the 
Administration will fall in irretrievable ruin the moment it shoots down 
one insurgent Filipino.”157 
In the end, though, Carnegie gave up the issue, and even supported 
McKinley in 1900. Carnegie’s contributions to the reelection campaign 
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were significant and signaled to other anti-imperialists that it was all right 
to let the fight go.158 Of all the supporters of imperialism that Carnegie 
detested, the one imperialist he could never bring himself to give up on 
was McKinley. Carnegie often wrote to the President to stop the tide of 
imperialism, but with little success. Carnegie believed that if McKinley 
chose to, he could end the imperialist craze by speaking out against it as 
President, and chastised him for not doing so.159 When McKinley never 
did so, Carnegie still never wavered from his admiration for the President, 
saying that he “[knew] the man as one of the best intentioned and purest 
living men – a model of every virtue…let it never be forgotten, however, 
that some of the direst evils that ever fell upon nations have come from the 
best men in all the domestic virtues, but men irresolute of purpose.” To 
Carnegie, McKinley had always had honest intentions but had been led 
astray by Congress and by popular jingoism.160  And Carnegie considered 
the Bryanist Democratic platform an assault on American courts and 
property rights, which meant that it would be better to support a “wrongful 
effort to force our government upon the Filipinos, in total disregard of 
Republican ideals, than fail to repel this covert attack upon the reign of 
law at home.”161 
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Supportive of McKinley, and never a total anti-imperialist, 
Carnegie was not ideologically prepared to continue the fight. Already in 
his autumn years when the Philippine question began, Carnegie fully 
retired from actively running his business in May 1899, and seemed to 
retire from the Philippine issue after a final few newspaper arguments in 
the months after the Senate’s ratification of the treaty.162 He was still 
unhappy about the results of the Philippine situation and roused himself 
again to write against the British policies in creating and fighting the 
Second Boer War. However, Carnegie mainly wanted to build his wealth, 
manage the creation of U.S. Steel in 1901, maintain his friendships in the 
Republican Party, and enjoy his Scottish estate.163  Burning bridges was a 
young man’s game, and the aging Carnegie had spoken his piece. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Samuel Gompers was born in the Spitalfields section of northeast 
London in 1850, to a family of Dutch Jews recently emigrated from 
Amsterdam. Though his family lived in dire poverty, and continued to 
grow (eventually to eleven children), his mother maintained a home with 
as many of their Dutch and Jewish traditions as possible within their 
British surroundings. Young Samuel got four years of basic education at 
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the Jewish Free School near his home, then went to work at the age of ten, 
at first briefly learning shoemaking, then taking up his father’s trade of 
cigarmaking. He would spend the rest of his life either as a worker or as a 
defender of worker’s rights.164 
 Samuel Gompers’ lifelong pursuit of workers’ rights determined 
his stance on everything else, including imperialism. In the middle of the 
19th century, cigarmakers were generally considered part of an artisanal 
profession, so there was very little unionization within the trade. In the 
period after the American Civil War, however, much of their work was 
moved to factories, and the cigarmakers began unionizing. Gompers 
would be elected President of his local United Cigarmakers Union in 
1875, and he helped to steer and rebuild the organization through the 
economic troubles of the mid- to late-1870s, which hurt or wiped out 
many of the organized labor groups in America.165 Gompers then gained 
prominence as he consolidated American craft unions into the AFL, and as 
its President worked to protect labor while seeking pragmatic solutions 
with business leaders and keeping American industry running. 
From the very beginning, Gompers’ self-identification was with 
the working classes first and foremost. As Gompers told the Executive 
Council of the AFL in 1896, “I am always on the side of the oppressed and 
the weak. It is one of the great principles of trades-unionism. If I am in 
America I am a union man; in England, I am a trades unionist; in 
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Germany, I would be a Socialist, and in Russia, I would be a Nihilist.”166 
Gompers opposed wars on general principle. Speaking against war with 
Britain during the Venezuelan boundary dispute, Gompers argued that 
“the working people know no country. … They are citizens of the world, 
and their religion is to do what is right, what is just, what is grand and 
glorious and valorous and chivalrous. The battle for the cause of labor, 
from times of remotest antiquity, has been for peace and good-will among 
men.”167  
Gompers fully rejected the common imperialist claim that war 
would give America a shot in the arm. Speaking generally of war, just a 
few weeks before the official outbreak of the Spanish-American War, 
Gompers delivered a speech arguing that in war “we are exchanging 
conditions and questions of peace for those of blood. The thoughts which 
labor is now thinking—the harmonizing thoughts of home and family and 
comfort—are to be changed to the animal and brutish thoughts of 
slaughter. War makes men brutal. War is brutal, always and forever.” He 
went on to say that “war cannot extinguish for all time the problem of 
employer and employed; war cannot make us forget forever the problem 
of machinery, of child labor, of closer human relations and of sanitary 
conditions. War can only displace them for a time with bloodier thoughts, 
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which give way in turn and leave us learning over again the primer of 
social conditions.”168  
Gompers saw calls for a naval buildup, or for Hawaiian annexation 
or for sending missionaries to China, as various forms of the same 
militarism, egged on by industrial interests, that was at the root of full-out 
warfare. As early as 1886, Gompers wrote in the Union Advocate that “the 
call for the unity of the working class to stamp out forever this diabolical 
capitalistic policy, should strike like a trumpet’s blast on the ear of every 
toiler in America, and stir him to energy like a battle cry.”169 Gompers 
himself did not often write in the press, lacking the time during this period 
of his life to produce ample editorials consistently, but he ensured that 
organs like the Union Advocate and the main AFL paper, the American 
Federationist, supported this viewpoint. 
Gompers opposed the American proposals for expansionism that 
came before the rise of the Philippine issue. Unlike the other three 
principal men of this study, Gompers was too young to have been of 
prominence during Grant’s unsuccessful push to annex Santo Domingo. 
He did, however, speak out against going to war over the Venezuelan 
boundary issue, and was one of the first and most vehement in opposing 
Hawaiian annexation. At the 1897 Convention of the AFL, in December 
of that year in Nashville, Gompers led the Committee on Resolutions in 
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approving a statement against the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 
calling annexation “tantamount to the admission of a slave State.”170 He 
repeated this concern personally in a letter to Speaker of the House 
Thomas Reed in June of 1898, calling it a slave state that would 
undermine labor everywhere, and arguing against the proposal that would 
become the Newlands Resolution and officially annex the islands as a 
United States territory.171 With Hawaii annexed and the Philippines under 
consideration as further American territory, Gompers spoke of the 
extremely pro-ownership regulations of labor in Hawaii and linked this to 
the island’s “eighty per cent Chinese and Japanese” population.172 
Gompers was afraid of Hawaiian annexation for the same reasons he 
feared Philippine annexation, and once Hawaiian annexation happened, he 
pointed to it as evidence of his claims about the Philippines’ future if they 
were made American territory. 
In regard to Cuba, Gompers’s position was different, due to his 
support for the rebels there and his own cigarmaking connections. There 
had been an active Cuban junta in New York for many years, and 
Gompers, having discovered it through some of his cigarmaker shopmates, 
attended some of its meetings. Publicly, Gompers initially supported 
Cuban independence on the grounds of preventing its workers being 
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abused by the Spanish.173 The Cuban Junta received the Cigar Makers’ 
Union’s official support beginning in 1895, though this did require that the 
Junta’s cigarmaker members unionize. Gompers’ larger AFL then passed a 
resolution at its 1895 meeting supporting the Cuban revolutionaries 
against the Spanish.174 Gompers supported a Senate resolution giving the 
Cuban revolutionaries belligerent status, and wrote a letter congratulating 
the members of the Cuban Revolutionary Party on its March 1896 
passage, saying he looked forward to the day when Cuba would be a free 
and independent nation working toward the rights of labor.175 And in 
December of that year, with popular support for the Cuban rebels 
continuing to rise, Gompers encouraged the Executive Council of the AFL 
to adopt a resolution similar to the Senate’s of March, saying that “the 
Cubans are fighting for their rights, and I hope that these resolutions will 
be adopted without a dissenting voice.”176  
Speaking on the advent of the Spanish-American War, Gompers 
was supportive of McKinley and ready to take revenge for the Maine. He 
stated that he was “for Cuba free and independent,” reminding his 
audience how “in New York I have ever helped the Cuban Junta. My 
advice has been sought, and as a representative of the laboring men and 
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women of the country I have assured the Cubans of our support. My 
devotion to the cause of Cuban liberty extends back for many years. In the 
long struggle that preceded the present war for years I devoted a part of 
my wages for the support of the Cuban cause.” And Gompers repeated the 
imperialist position almost exactly: “[T]he massacre of innocent men, 
women, and children must be stopped. Starvation of thousands must be 
tolerated no longer. We want due reparation for the killing of our men and 
the destruction of our battleship. [Applause.] Cuba is too far away from 
Spain to belong to Spain. It is a part of this hemisphere, and will be 
enrolled among the list of American republics.” Gompers did temper this 
enthusiasm for intervention with a word for the troubles of labor, 
explaining that “the Cuban question will trouble everything until it is 
settled, and that is one of the powerful reasons why labor wishes for the 
freedom of Cuba.” However, Gompers maintained that “a more powerful 
reason is that the granting of political freedom to a people but precedes the 
securing for them of economic freedom…in all this American labor is 
vitally interested and opposed to the existence of any rotten Spanish 
autocracy in Cuba.”177  
Gompers was willing to support great sacrifices for the cause of 
Cuban freedom. Asked what effect war would have on the laboring 
people, Gompers warned that “it would make corpses of the men, widows 
of the women and orphans of the children, for it is the laboring man who 
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must defend his country’s flag and it is the laboring man…who must die 
for its honor. … And yet I would have war rather than retreat from the 
wise, firm and honorable position which this country has taken in regard 
to Cuba.”178 However, Gompers soon found that his specific support of 
Cuban liberation accidentally played into the larger push for empire.  
Gompers was surprised by Cuba’s role in imperialism, in part 
because he held some faith in President McKinley, whose initial professed 
support for Cuban independence, along with avoidance of war to achieve 
it, pleased Gompers.179 Unlike many anti-imperialists, Gompers had a 
prior personal connection to the President, dating from McKinley’s time 
as Governor of Ohio. McKinley had helped promote unions in the state, 
but also brought out the state militia at the first sign of violent strikes 
spreading. Once he was President, McKinley pushed for sound money and 
the quick resolution of labor/ownership disputes. Though split by the 
imperialism issue, and though McKinley was not a particularly close 
friend of labor, Gompers would often say that he and McKinley “had been 
friends ‘for many years’ before 1897.”180 But when the Spanish met every 
American demand and the U.S. still declared war on April 11th, Gompers 
unhappily changed his mind about McKinley’s intentions. Though in 
accord with the wide popular feeling for Cuba’s rebels, Gompers had 
always feared that support for the Cubans might be turned into a wider 
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imperialistic movement. As Gompers wrote to a friend in 1897, “the 
sympathy of our movement with Cuba is genuine, earnest, and sincere, but 
this does not for a moment imply that we are committed to certain 
adventurers who are apparently suffering from Hysteria.”181 When his 
fears came to pass, he was galled by those whom he saw as leading the 
efforts to use Cuba as an excuse for annexing other territories. Giving one 
of his major anti-imperialist speeches, at the Chicago Peace Jubilee in 
October of 1898, Gompers asked the crowd “if we give freedom and 
independence to Cuba, to which she is entitled, is there any justification 
for our enforced conquest and annexation of Porto Rico [sic]? … In the 
case of the Philippines we have the question repeated, only in a much 
more aggravated form.”182 
Part of Gompers’ reasoning for opposing expansion was what he 
called a “criminal folly” perpetrated by jingoes who wanted to distract 
Americans from domestic troubles with foreign adventures. He claimed 
that the upper classes “indicated that they hope to see changes in our 
boundaries, talk of alliances and wars, and perhaps war and conquests, all 
to keep the workers and the lovers of reforms and simple justice diverted 
and powerless to dig out abuses and cure existing injustice.” He said that 
the constant armed buildup, the use of force, and the exploitation involved 
in having an imperialist national policy “will tend to breed contempt for 
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the manual toiler, and encourage the pernicious notion that the strong may 
properly exploit the weak, and be used to furnish the luxuries for an 
oligarchy.”183 And with the islands in question taken as American 
territory, Gompers would wonder “how long will it be…before the 
dominant classes in this country will look to the use of force rather than 
the will of the majority for support in furthering their plans? Will it not be 
easy to pass from contemptuous indifference to the natural rights and 
wishes of the dark-skinned wage-earners of the Philippines to a similar 
attitude toward manual toilers of our own blood and country?”184 
Phrases like “dark-skinned” were common to Gompers’ arguments 
against imperialism, as racism permeated his views on the Philippines and 
other outlying islands. He greatly feared the immigration of savage 
peoples from newly American far-flung possessions: “If the Philippines 
are annexed, what is to prevent the Chinese, the Negritos and the Malays 
coming to our country? How can we prevent the Chinese coolies from 
going to the Philippines and from there swarming into the United States 
engulfing our people and our civilization? If these new islands are to 
become ours, it will be either under the form of Territories or States. Can 
we hope to close the flood gates of immigration from the hordes of 
Chinese and the semi-savage races coming from what will then be part of 
our own country? Certainly, if we are to retain the principles of law 
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enunciated from the foundation of our Government, no legislation of such 
a character can be expected.”185 Like his fearful racial classification of the 
Hawaiians, Gompers would describe the Filipinos as being “a semi-
barbaric population almost primitive in their habits and customs, as unlike 
the people of the United States in thought, sentiment, education, morals, 
hopes, aspirations, or governmental forms as night is to day.”186 The 
inferiority Gompers saw in the Filipinos was essential to his belief that, as 
inferior people, they would work for lower wages and be more complacent 
in doing it, thus taking jobs from regular, Anglo-Saxon Americans.  
Gompers’ racism also translated to issues within the AFL. The 
union experienced unprecedented growth between 1898 and 1902, and 
was just then beginning to become a really national movement. But this 
meant that its expansion in the South led Gompers to accommodate certain 
prejudices, even agreeing at the AFL’s 1900 convention in Louisville to 
allow certain levels of certain unions to organize along segregated lines.187 
When Gompers did support the labor rights of African-Americans, it was 
generally to support the larger interests of the AFL, such as at its 1897 
Convention, when Gompers spoke out for a resolution protecting colored 
workers in order to deny American business ownership a cheaper option 
than whites. If the AFL did not give the colored workers an opportunity to 
organize, Gompers warned, the capitalists would use them as a barrier to 
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union goals and to rights for all other workers.188 But blacks were 
excluded from most AFL unions, and black workers, as late as 1910, made 
a third of the wages that white workers made. For the most part, Gompers 
would not touch the issue. He wrote to one affiliated union that he 
“[regarded] the race problem as one with which you people of the 
Southland will have to deal; without the interference, too, of meddlers 
from the outside.”189  
Gompers also backed the economic argument that “trade does not 
always follow the flag,” shared and propounded by men like Schurz and 
Carnegie. Gompers said that this imperialist fallacy’s untruth was “borne 
out by the evidences right at our hands; the flag of England floats over 
Canada, that of Spain did, until recently, over Cuba, the South American 
Republics are practically our haven, and in each of these instances the 
reverse of the proposition that trade follows the flag prevails.” Gompers 
conceded that the expansion of trade was essential and appropriate for 
America’s health, but he insisted “that it is not necessary for us to violate 
the principles upon which our government is founded; to throw to the 
winds the declaration that governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of the governed; that it is not necessary that we shall become a 
nation of conquerors, a nation founded upon physical force; that it is not 
necessary that we shall subjugate by the force of arms any other people in 
order to obtain that expansion of trade.” Gompers emphasized this kind of 
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argument, writing that “the issues yet to come” would pit “the ‘almighty 
dollar,’ with all that portends, on the one side – justice, right, humanity, 
liberty, true Americanism on the other.”190 
Gompers was far from a free trader, advocating tariffs and 
immigration quotas to protect the American working man, and he feared 
that America could not protect laborers in the continental United States by 
enacting barriers against Philippine trade if the Philippines themselves 
were American territory. He wrote that those who disagreed forgot “the 
fact that the American Republic occupies a unique position among the 
nations of the world, and that its general legislation must be of a general 
character, applying to all the people over whom its flag floats, and 
jurisdiction extends. … See the Constitution of the United States.”191 
Gompers’ adherence to protecting labor, above all else, made him 
fiercely independent on any other issue. At an April speech in Kansas 
City, an audience member asked Gompers to explain, since he “[said] we 
are living under a false economic system[,] What shall we put in place of 
it?” Gompers replied that he wanted “a true one; one that will be evolved 
out of the intellectual progress of our people.” As reported, another 
questioner asked him if the kind of political discussion necessary to this 
was allowed in labor unions, and Gompers replied forcefully: “’No, sir!’ 
Mr. Gompers pushed his head out beyond the footlights and glared. ‘I’ll 
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tell you what we won’t allow, sir. We won’t allow the labor unions to 
become the tail of any political kite, sir.’”192 To Gompers, the politics of 
labor and of class were supreme, and he believed that other organizations 
and groups did not understand this fully enough. No other issue mattered 
as much; as convinced as he was of the imperialism question, Gompers 
even admitted a willingness to bend on the imperialism question if it 
served the interests of labor. Speaking in New York in July of 1898, with 
the war in full swing but the Philippine question not yet at the fore, 
Gompers opined that “the Government may annex any old thing, and I 
shall be content, so long as the laws relating to labor are observed. The 
war is a glorious and righteous one as far as the United States is 
concerned.”193 
Gompers’ vision of America, determined by his view of the 
primacy of labor, was of the United States becoming the world’s greatest 
and most enlightened economy: “The nation which dominates the markets 
of the world will surely control its destinies. To make of the United States 
a vast workshop is our manifest destiny, and our duty, and…basing the 
conditions of the workers upon the highest intelligence and the most 
exalted standard of life, no obstacle can be placed in our way to the 
attainment of the highest pinnacle of national glory and human 
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progress.”194 He saw imperialistic land-grabbing as a distraction to the 
workers, and believed that an essential part of the workers’ good qualities 
was their civilized racial makeup, so imperialism, to Gompers, was 
nothing but a detriment to his ideal America. In regards to the Philippine 
question in particular, Gompers wondered “[T]o attain this end is the 
acquirement of the Philippine Islands, with their semi-savage population, 
necessary? Surely not. Neither its gates nor those of any other country of 
the globe can long be closed against our constantly growing industrial 
supremacy.”195 He argued that we would treat the Filipinos as we treated 
the Indians, but without the reasonable expectation that crowds of white 
people would move into the land and take their place, thereby degrading 
America’s racial makeup and its national character. “The climate of the 
Philippines forbids forever manual labor by Americans, as it does the 
planting there of American families, to live and flourish from one 
generation to another.” If a colonial-administration-type group of 
Americans were sent there, said Gompers, “for the first time in our history 
we shall have minority rule of the most extreme, permanent and brazen 
type, under the American flag and upheld by the forces of the republic. … 
Can the fundamental principles of our Government, equality of rights, no 
taxation or government without representation, and the like, be mocked in 
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the most unblushing manner, under the flag, without sapping respect for 
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence?”196 
Gompers claimed total sincerity and determination toward the anti-
imperialist cause. He said it was key to the nation’s future, as he wrote in 
August of 1898, and that “we are living in a time when it requires cool 
judgment of sterling men to prevent a very grave injury being done to our 
people. A mistake now, a departure from the splendid principles which 
have made us so great, is enough to cause alarm to every man who loves 
the Republic and who seeks its perpetuity.”197  
But as time went on, Gompers would lose track of the issue, 
returning his focus to protecting American labor. Initially he was a 
focused and stalwart member of the Anti-Imperialist League, joining near 
the end of 1898 and becoming one of its many Vice Presidents. Gompers 
was really the only important labor leader who showed much interest in 
the group, just as he had been one of the few major figures outside of the 
middle and upper classes of the Midwest and Northeast to support 
arbitration with Venezuela in 1895. Gompers argued strongly for the cause 
and was one of the leaders who opposed Bryan’s idea of ratifying the 
treaty and then working out the status of the Philippines later on.198 
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After all that, however, Gompers saw that the movement had lost 
the battle, and he essentially accepted imperialism as an American policy. 
He worked his hardest to make sure that labor laws were enforced and 
American workers protected along the way, but after early 1899, in 
regards to America’s new possessions, Gompers would not object to 
anything unrelated to labor. Traveling to Puerto Rico shortly after the 
Treaty was ratified, Gompers worked hard to protect a group of trade 
union officials in Puerto Rico from the abuses of business ownership and 
sought to bolster its AFL to “spread the gospel of Americanism among the 
people of the Island.” But on a larger level, Gompers accepted that Puerto 
Rico would be an American possession for the near future, and called it “a 
great factory exploiting cheap labor for the benefit of large corporations in 
the United States.” He also paid a visit to Cuba in February of 1900 to 
encourage its workers to organize, but otherwise Gompers did little for 
Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rico or the Philippines in the years after that.199 
 When the Philippines hung in the balance, Gompers was in the 
midst of turning his AFL into a national movement for labor. As much as 
he opposed the annexation of the Philippines, on the grounds of economics 
and of racism, Gompers returned to his main business soon after the fight 
was lost. Within a few years of the defeat of the movement against 
annexing the Philippines, Gompers was leading an ever-growing 
movement of American workers and chiding those who still hoped for a 
less imperialistic America. “Peace,” Gompers would claim in 1905, 
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“comes from conscious intelligence and power, and not from hysterical, 
effeminate supplications for an ideal state.”200 
 
* * * * * 
 
The major émigré anti-imperialists were no more successful that 
the other anti-imperialists in preventing American annexation of the 
Philippines. The treaty of annexation was ratified by the Senate on 
February 4th, 1899, shots were exchanged between American and Filipino 
troops outside of Manila that night, and full-scale violence broke out in 
what had become American territory. The Anti-Imperialist League 
hobbled on, but could not effectively argue for letting the Philippine 
Islands go once American blood had been spilt to fight the rebels and keep 
the islands. The League continued to meet under its same name and 
organization for another two decades, though without a rallying cause like 
the Philippines to focus real effort on it lost most of its members and 
became a small, chiefly Boston-based enclave. Just like the other major 
League members, with the notable exception of Moorfield Storey, the 
émigrés abandoned the organization when they saw that their particular 
fight was over.201 
The émigré anti-imperialists moved on to other things by century’s 
end. Godkin was sixty-eight, in poor health, and would pass away a few 
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years later in 1902. Schurz was a full seventy years old, was still presiding 
over the National Civil Service Reform League, and would last until 1906, 
only a few more years than Godkin. Carnegie was sixty-four, and would 
enjoy a long life of eighty-three years, but regardless had begun his 
retirement as the Filipinos and Americans began trading small-arms fire. 
Gompers was something of an exception, at not yet fifty years of age. 
While the other three émigrés were beginning to enjoy the fruits of 
retirement, Gompers’ AFL was just then becoming a truly national 
organization, and demanded his full efforts. 
During the fight against Philippine annexation, the émigrés had 
offered many of the same arguments against imperialism that the other 
League members and unassociated anti-imperialists did. They made 
practical arguments against its efficacy and wisdom as an American 
foreign policy. They pointed to the Constitution’s guarantees of freedom, 
applied to any and all American territory (a requirement which the Insular 
Cases would later abrogate), and to the unacceptability of using Cuban 
liberation as justification for Puerto Rican and Philippine conquest. They 
argued that far-flung American colonies would overextend America’s 
armed forces and embroil the United States in further international 
conflicts. And they pointed to American abuses in the islands themselves, 
like the “water cure” in the Philippines, as inhuman and beneath the 
dignity of their United States. 
 78 
The émigrés were also consistent with the general mold of the anti-
imperialists as aged men. The Anti-Imperialist League, with its leadership 
and notables  comprised mainly of august statesmen, contrasted poorly 
with the youthful vigor of the Roosevelts and Lodges and Beveridges 
supporting imperialism. In Robert Beisner’s study of twelve major anti-
imperialist figures, which includes Carnegie, Schurz, and Godkin, he notes 
that the twelve of them were a combined 835 years in age by 1900, and of 
the twelve only Carnegie would live to see America enter the First World 
War.202  
The émigrés, like the others in the movement, were also idealists, 
ever hopeful about America and its people. All four émigrés maintained a 
belief that the American people did not really back the “jingoes”, and were 
either duped into supporting imperialism or underrepresented in their 
opposition to it. And they were all staunchly independent in order to work 
for causes they believed in: Godkin with his caustic, independent-minded 
editorials, Schurz in his consistent Mugwump stance whether in or out of 
office, Gompers’ refusal to make the AFL “the tail” of another group or 
party, and Carnegie’s freedom, through tremendous wealth, to keep his 
own counsel on issues of the day. None of the émigrés faced an agonizing 
choice over abandoning their McKinleyite friendships to oppose 
imperialism, because the rightness of choosing to do so was, to them, self-
evident.  
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However, the broader anti-imperialist movement was a fragmented 
one. The émigrés stood out from the anti-imperialists in their general 
agreement on most issues, rooted in their experiences as well-established 
immigrants to the United States from Western Europe. Émigré anti-
imperialism, as represented by Godkin, Schurz, Carnegie and Gompers, 
was part of their broader belief in the primacy of the individual, rather 
than the state, in a properly organized American society. Having left mid-
19th century Europe, where democratic and popular movements were 
soundly crushed by the ruling elites, and built their lives in an America of 
Gilded Age governmental ineffectiveness and corruption, the émigrés 
were unwilling to support policies that gave the state greater and 
unchecked powers over the individual. They were made into practical 
libertarians by their experiences, and this libertarianism was at the root of 
their anti-imperialism. 
Economically, the émigrés were in agreement on the major issues, 
though Gompers had a constituency he was bound to speak for that 
disagreed with the émigrés. All but Gompers strongly favored maintaining 
the gold standard, some of them even more than they wished to end 
imperialism. Schurz, as staunch a Mugwump as could be found, always 
cautioned that Americans could “call fifty cents a dollar and you’ll have 
more dollars, but not more wealth.”203 Godkin editorially railed against 
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most forms of socialism and called Bryan an “anarchist.”204 Carnegie 
demonstrated his convictions on sound money in 1900, when, given the 
choice in 1900 of backing Bryan and fighting imperialism, or backing 
McKinley and fighting free silver, Carnegie stuck with the President.205 
On tariff issues, too, the three older émigrés agreed that freer trade was the 
best policy. Godkin was most outspoken on it, both in the pages of the 
Nation and as a close associate of the American Free Trade League, 
founded in 1867.206 Schurz worked to make free trade, along with most 
liberal Republican policies, part of the party’s platform in every 
election.207 Carnegie was lampooned as a wealthy foreigner profiting from 
high tariffs in the 1880s and 1890s, but retirement allowed him to act 
purely on principle, and by 1908 he was testifying in favor of ending the 
duty on steel before the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means 
Committee.208 Gompers is an outlier from the émigré group on gold and 
tariffs: he backed the likes of the pro-silver Populist Party in the early 
1890s, and always worked hard to maintain high tariffs which could 
protect workers. But Gompers considered the Populists only a lesser evil 
than other parties, worked to maintain the AFL’s political independence at 
all times, and said that after the political campaigns, “when the blare of 
trumpets has died away, and the ‘spell-binders’ have received their 
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rewards, the American Federation of Labor will still be found plodding 
along, doing noble battle in the struggle for the uplifting of the toiling 
masses.” And in all economic issues he fought for the individual worker 
against the depredations of corporations and trusts, a principle that, on a 
level higher than practical policy, was right in line with his fellow émigrés 
and their focus on the individual.209 
The three elder émigrés were also in lockstep on civil service 
reform. Schurz instituted many reformist measures while he was Secretary 
of the Interior under Hayes, and was the President of the National Civil 
Service Reform League from 1892 until 1901, giving the issue as much or 
more attention as he gave anti-imperialism.210 Godkin’s Nation opined that 
civil service reform would bring the country’s everyday affairs back under 
the control of the “intelligent and virtuous.”211 And Carnegie was a 
proponent of meritocracy above all else, happy to see measures like the 
Pendleton Act made law. 
All four men believed in some form of racial superiority or 
inferiority, and it was a part of their opposition to imperialism. Schurz’s 
racism was rooted in a belief that tropical climates degraded peoples, 
leading him to defend African-Americans as worthy of every right given 
white Americans, yet believe that inviting “the Malays and Tagals of the 
Philippines to participation in the conduct of our government is so 
                                                 
209 Mandel, Samuel Gompers, 150-151. 
210 Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, ed. Frederic Bancroft. 
Volume 5, 340. 
211 Armstrong, E. L. Godkin: A Biography, 122. 
 82 
alarming that you instinctively pause before taking the step.”212 Godkin’s 
elitism drove him to resent any group, whether it was immigrants, the 
lower classes, or “Asiatics” of the Philippines, if it seemed to fail to 
achieve what he viewed as sufficient culture and class.213 Gompers 
embraced racism as an essential part of his economic argument, saying 
there was no way to “prevent the Chinese coolies from going to the 
Philippines and from there swarming into the United States engulfing our 
people and our civilization,” an opinion on the subject that was in line 
with the views of most of the AFL’s membership.214 For his part Carnegie 
was more likely to celebrate Anglo-American culture than denigrate 
“colored” races, but still believed that “the pride of race” was key to 
America’s sense of self, “latent, indeed, in quiet times, but decisively 
shown in supreme moments when stirred by great issues which affect the 
safety of the old home and involve the race. The strongest sentiment in 
man, the real motive which at the crisis determines his action in 
international affairs is racial. Upon this tree grow the one language, one 
religion, one literature, and one law which bind them together, and make 
them brothers in time of need as against me of other races.”215  
                                                 
212 From Schurz’s speech “The Issue of Imperialism”. Cited in Lasch, “The Anti-
Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man,” 327. 
213 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900, 65. 
214 Speech at the Chicago Peace Jubilee, October 18th, 1898. From Gompers, The Samuel 
Gompers Papers, ed. Kaufman, Albert, and Palladino, V. 5, 28. Also Mandel, Samuel 
Gompers, 204-205. 
215 Letter to Swire Smith, March 7th, 1898. V. 49, AC Papers, LOC. 
 83 
These particular racisms of the émigrés were in line with many 
other anti-imperialists (with a few exceptions216). The issue, in its time, 
was viewed as a decision whether to take peoples who were their nature 
burdensome and inferior into the American body politic. The imperialists 
demanded that America take on the Kipling-phrased “White Man’s 
Burden”, the task of civilizing and Christianizing far-off peoples, while 
Godkin spoke for the émigrés and many other anti-imperialists when his 
Nation wondered "why the Filipinos have not the right to try to govern 
themselves as well as any other people. If they fail we consider it no 
concern of ours, any more than to accelerate their progress towards 
civilization and self-government."217  
Part of the émigrés’ lack of desire to Christianize the natives of the 
Philippines came from their own religious backgrounds. None of them 
strictly adhered to any religious creed more complicated than a general 
spirituality. Schurz’s family was not a part of the rigid Catholicism of their 
village of Liblar, and Carl’s interest in Christianity was never particularly 
strong.218 Godkin was an avowed skeptic from his young adulthood on, 
critical of organized religion throughout his life, and blamed little of what 
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happened in the world on the supernatural, once wryly commenting that 
New York City’s problems were “owing to the bad conduct of certain 
men, and owing to nothing else under heaven.”219 Carnegie’s family 
disliked the strict Calvinism of Scottish Presbyterianism and exposed him 
instead to the spiritualistic Swedenborgians, and Carnegie liked how, as he 
wrote to Dod in August 1853, “ ‘doing of a thing’ because our 
grandfathers did it…is not an ‘American Institution.’”220 Gompers was 
raised Jewish, never closely followed the faith, and later in life worked 
with freethinkers like Robert Ingersoll, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and W. E. 
B. DuBois to establish what they called the “Society for Human Progress” 
in 1892. For Gompers, secularism was key to the eventual liberation of 
labor.221 The émigrés were not swayed by the Christianity-based 
arguments for imperialism, and so while many imperialists spoke of a 
Destiny made Manifest by God’s will which they were Duty-bound to 
carry out, and attributed the ease of Dewey’s victory at Manila to Divine 
Providence, the émigrés maintained a rationalist view of the war and of 
annexation as simple conquest. 
The émigrés all opposed the kind of militarism that demanded 
conquering far-off lands, and were all at least uneasy with warfare in 
general. Godkin was just as heartbroken by the Boer War as by the 
Spanish-American War, saw the war with Spain as an entirely cynical land 
grab, and railed against every single American expansion scheme of the 
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previous quarter century.222 Gompers viewed any militarism, especially 
the kind that led the country to pointlessly and bloodily expand itself, as 
encouraging “the pernicious notion that the strong may properly exploit 
the weak, and be used to furnish the luxuries for an oligarchy.”223 Schurz 
was the only one of the émigrés who had seen combat, as a “Forty-
Eighter” from the Revolutions of 1848 in Germany, and as a Union Army 
Major General who fought with valor at Chancellorsville in the Civil War. 
Those, however, were wars that Schurz believed to be necessary for the 
promotion of individual liberties, whereas he saw a massive Mahanist fleet 
and far-flung island possessions as unnecessary, militaristic 
extravagances, beneath the dignity of a republic, especially one so 
advantageously situated in the Western Hemisphere.224 And Carnegie’s 
ideals were nonviolent ones: notwithstanding his willingness to rely on 
government support in violent strikebreaking, Carnegie was against the 
government’s violent subjugation of foreign peoples.225 Prussia, and less 
so Britain, had entrenched, class-based military establishments throughout 
the 19th century. Because they experienced such militaristic social orders 
firsthand, in their former countries, the émigrés were horrified by the 
stirrings of similarly militaristic ideas among the jingoes of America. 
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The Anti-Imperialist League was made up of a wide array of 
oppositional groups and political philosophies. This lack of unity was key 
to its failure to prevent Philippine annexation. Yet the émigré anti-
imperialists were of a single, cohesive worldview and politics. The roots 
varied, depending on the particulars of the émigré’s European origins and 
distinguished career in American life. Overall, though, Godkin, Schurz, 
Carnegie and Gompers emerge from the fractured jumble of the failed 
anti-imperialist cause as a clear and libertarian unit of opposition to 
Philippine annexation. 
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